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Note to the Reader 
 
 
In 2012 we launched the now-inoperative journal Singular-
um, whose modus operandi read like this: 
 
Singularum operates on the premise that every facet of 
life yields transformative aesthetic encounters. It pro-
vides an independent venue for theorizing, transmitt-
ing, and staging these encounters. Its strategic aim is 
to exhibit thinking born at the interface of aesthetics 
& pedagogy. 
 
Unable to sustain this short-lived project in its original form, 
we decided to convert its two volumes into books, the first of 
which is devoted to the work of nomadic American philo-
sopher Alphonso Lingis. Thanks to the generosity of punc-
tum books director Eileen Joy, along with her dedicated 
accomplice Andrew Doty, you are now reading the foreword 
to what was once Volume 1 of Singularum. 
 
Tom Sparrow & Bobby George 




   
 
Love Poem: After Alphonso Lingis 
by Dorothea Lasky 
 
 
What I to you 
I loved you 
But you also meant nothing to me 
 
You were nothing but 
A box jellyfish 
The edges always coming out to meet the water 
  
A skin of water, not water-blue 
So that there was nothing we could find like ourselves 
  
And nothing like a center 
So that the animal was not a beak 
But a movement forward 
  
So that speech was not a thing to say  
But a thing to be attracted to 







And when I went swimming through the pond 
I was a transparent body  
That went to you 
  
And when I went flying through the air 
It was your distinction, not similarity 
That called to me 
  
And when I died and my awe  
Completely upturned 
I held myself, my breath 
  
My spiritus 
Which had always swirled around you 
In clear folds I knew of, the skin 
  
So that the only indication 
Of another world 
Were the rain and snow 
  
And when I was reborn again 
I was only an infant 
But still, you asked me to dance with you 
  
And I did dance with you, my father 
Do you remember us both, both babies 
Moving closely around the sky 
  
In the icy wind 
In the orange water 
Full of flies 
  
In the sunny terrain 
Of black hills 
The home 





The home we knew 
And even if it takes a while 
I will meet you there again 

   
  
  
Interview with Alphonso Lingis 
conducted by Bobby George & Tom Sparrow 
 
 
BG & TS: As you know, we’re planning to enter your body 
of work through the lens of photography and geography. We 
thought we’d start our conversation there, at that conjunc-
tion. What motivated you to start to include photos in your 
text? 
 
AL: In Excesses I thought I had to show a temple at Khaju-
raho, for readers who had never seen images of them. I also 
wanted to include a Nuba man photographed by Leni Rief-
enstahl—a photograph that, when I first came upon it, made 
me decide to go there (the text does not explain that). 
The photographs are not inserted at places in the text that 
they would illustrate; they are put before the chapters. They 
bring readers to the places and people that the texts will de-
scribe and discuss. 
When in 2009 I went back over 40 years of photographs 
to pick out those that were published in Contact, I was aston-
ished and moved to find that I remembered every one of 
those people, so many only encountered for a few minutes on 
the street—and remembered the place, the time of day, the 






changed. It made me realize that the photographs show not 
simply a particular individual, but a setting, a field or arena 
where events took place. As Leni Riefenstahl’s photograph 
had sent me to East Africa, the other photographs in the 
book send readers to places far away and now long ago. 
The images are in their own way narrative—and the texts 
in their own way depict. In recent decades so many philoso-
phers have denounced the idea that language is representa-
tion. They have not analyzed the way language lays out a 
setting of the world, makes us see people and events. We 
speak of absent things, far-off things and things that have 
passed on, and language depicts them and makes them con-
tinuous with the environment visible about us. 
 
BG & TS: In a way, it seems to us that philosophy has not 
always taken photography seriously, at least not seriously 
enough. Not unlike language, philosophy has denounced 
photography as representation. Yet, your texts and photos 
announce a ‘setting, a field or arena’, at once intimate and 
distant, moving beyond these criticisms. Can you articulate 
this oscillation between language and photography, and how 
you see the expansion into a new geography? 
 
AL: Thinking about photographic images, I think we come 
to revise the way philosophy distinguished between reality 
and image and between subjective and objective. Discover 
images that the things, and not the human mind, engender. 
Since Descartes and Locke and their friends, a critical 
question for philosophy was: How can I be sure that I am not 
dreaming? How to establish the difference between percep-
tions that genuinely exhibit real things, and dreams that are 
concocted within the mind by the mind? “Images” in general 
were taken to be fabricated by the mind itself. 
I instead set out to recognize that the things themselves 
engender “images” or doubles of themselves—shadows, hal-





os, the images of themselves they project on water, on the 
glass of windows—and also on the surfaces of the eyes of 
mammals, birds, fish. For example, the puddle of water that 
appears shimmering on the surface of the road ahead in a hot 
day is not “subjective,” produced by the mind; it is engen-
dered by the road and the sun and everybody in the car sees 
it. 
I then was really struck by the fact that these real or ob-
jective images the things generate captivate us and excite in 
us the pleasure of seeing. For Heidegger we are always on the 
lookout for implements, obstacles, paths, objectives. To the 
contrary, I recognized that when we step out into the world 
we are captivated by the shifting profiles and angles the 
things exhibit, the shadows and the reflections, the glitter on 
the lake and the radiance blazoning the outlines of the 
clouds, the shifting shadows and light on the face on the per-
son we are talking to. And all this excites pleasure and keeps 
us fascinated and delighted by the things arrayed about us. 
Merleau-Ponty distinguished between the “real properties 
of things”—the shape and size and color when we are in the 
optimal viewing position and all the “perspectival defor-
mations” which we take as relays toward that vision of the 
real shape, size, and color. 
But I think that all these perspectival variations, shadows, 
reflections swarm in the environment about us, and we do 
not only take them as transitions toward the sight of the real 
shape, size, and color. They captivate us in themselves, de-
light us, excite pleasure. 
It is true that the mind can also fabricate images—in 
dreams, daydreaming, “imagination.” So I distinguish:  
—the appearances in which things reveal their real shape, 
size, color to us stationed at the optimal position and right 
lighting. 
—the appearances that we take as transitional toward 






tangular even though we are looking at it from an angle. 
—the perspectival variations, shadows, reflections, etc. 
the things themselves engender. 
—images that are fabricated within the mind by the 
mind. These can be simple, false, or creative, artistry. 
Photographic images are made by light and the camera; 
the photographer only positions and focuses. But the pleas-
ure of photographic images is to capture images that the 
things themselves engender, in certain lighting, in shadow, in 
specific ways they group together. 
Thinking about language and photographic images also 
leads to new conceptions of both. The concept of representa-
tion is obscure and misleading. Words do not simply stand 
for, stand in the place of, things that are absent. They do not 
simply stimulate our minds to produce images of things. I 
was very struck by Heidegger’s statements about how words 
invoke and summon forth things. (I think of the words of the 
medium who summons the dead to appear in the room.) 
When he speaks of the bridge over the river Rhine, we do 
not simply attend to an image or concept of the bridge in our 
own minds; instead we attend to the bridge itself where it is, 
on the Rhine. The words of a novel lay out a landscape, a 
situation, events about us. (We do not simply look at the 
words and imagine the object each word refers to.) (Nor do 
the words simply direct attention to a landscape we have al-
ready imagined.) With the words that name the protagonist 
and some details of the setting, the whole protagonist and 
the complex setting form about us. Last summer I read Knut 
Hansun’s Growth of the Soil. Written in a spare, economic 
language. But as I read the book how present and how dense 
and complex life in the Norwegian landscape in the last cen-
tury hovered about me. 
In looking at photos I took 40 years ago, I trembled to re-
alize how it all became present again in the image—the shy 
or ironic feeling of the person, the density of life in that per-





son, the spot on the road one day in India, the rhythm and 
sounds of that day—all those reflections and images radiating 
off the person, the road, the things of the setting. That is 
how I came to recognize a kinship between language and 
photography—that power in both to invoke and summon 
forth, bring things into presence. 
You ask about the new geography language and photo-
graphs unfold, a wonderful and striking thought. I am afraid 
I have gotten involved in the “ontological status” of images 
and of the vocative power of language. But I shall stop now; I 
shall have to ponder your question more. 
 
BG & TS: Certainly the photographs in your texts recall 
scenes that are, for you, autobiographical. The affective 
content of these images must be much thicker for you than it 
is for your readers, although your words often work to gen-
erate a rhythm that is capable of drawing readers into the 
photograph and the scene it is borne out of, thus providing a 
certain tangibility to your prose. Levinas, in “Reality and Its 
Shadow,” speaks of how the musicality and rhythm of images 
has the capacity to render the spectator a passive participant 
in the spectacle itself. As a photographer, do you see yourself 
as spectator or participant in the rhythm of your photo-
graphs? Whatever your view, do you find that your photo-
graphs have the ability to convey to readers the autobio-
graphical content of your travels? 
 
AL: I will not talk about the experience of professional pho-
tographers, those who produce wedding albums, architecture 
and landscape books, mesmerizing images for celebrities and 
commodities. I just want to talk about walking when one 
walks with a camera. 
I had long resisted buying a camera, thinking that there 
was something false about collecting images of things seen 






retain the past. I thought that what was real was what from a 
trip left one changed. I started taking pictures when a friend 
who was taking me to the airport gave me a camera on the 
way. 
I soon realized that the camera had changed my percep-
tion. The light: it was no longer just cleared space in which 
things took form; it had direction, it led the gaze, its shafts 
excavated situations isolated in the dark, sometimes it spread 
in a scintillating, dazzling, blazing medium without bounda-
ries. Shadows took on substance; they stretched, flowed, 
condensed things in themselves. It occurred to me that I saw 
them that way when I was a child. Things looked different: 
the contours of shadows and of things that overlapped other 
things pushed out the contours that contained things in 
themselves. Flat surfaces showed corrugations, grain, stubble 
and texture, and sheets of gleam. And the continuity of the 
landscape drifting by would be abruptly broken by momen-
tary events—the spiraling neck of a heron probing the space, 
the poised pause of an antelope, the legs of a child in an ara-
besque she will never be able to do once grown up, the grin 
of a passerby at something inward. The landscape is abruptly 
splintered, a segment isolates, magnetizes, and pulls the 
glance into it. 
A gesture, some steps, a contour, an encounter stops pass-
ing, stops transitioning, and breaks out, presents itself. A 
profile turned, an overlapping of wagon and wall, a gleam or 
zigzag line of light, most often only there an instant. But 
disconnected from the field, from situations passing, from 
orientations and goals. Purely present. 
Abruptly you stop. That gait, that stride that kept your 
body going on arrested, that sweep of the eyes braked, your 
breath stopped, your heart beat skips. Redirected, you are 
pulled into that disconnected segment where a strange light 
glimmers, a bird bobs his head, a smile flashes. You feel that 
tense poised pose of an antelope contracted in your body, 





that smile flashing in the face of a stranger in the road fills all 
space and flashes in your eyes. 
This transfiguration of the environment into scintillating 
moments of pure presence, and these moments of ecstatic 
participation, are the reason to walk with a camera. To be 
sure these moments of rapture in the midst of forest trees all 
around, in the midst of a crowded street happen without a 
camera in one’s hand. They are the reason our eyes are not, 
as Heidegger would have it, always interested, on the look-
out, looking for objectives, paths, implements, obstacles. Our 
eyes are fascinated by the immensities outside, never tire of 
looking, because of these disconnected moments of surprise 
and pleasure, of rapture. 
But with the camera in hand, these trance moments be-
come metaphysical; the sinewy movement of a branch on the 
surface of a lake is doubled, displaced, into your eyes and 
heartbeat and also across the camera into far-off places and 
rooms where it will dance again in a long vanished light. A 
camera, one could say, is a tool or an instrument. But when 
you install a light switch, it is all lined up first in the mind: 
the wire that will conduct the current to the interruptor, the 
wire that will bring the current to the ceiling light, the wire 
that send the current on, the wire that will bring excess 
charge to the ground, the insulated pliers that will twist and 
connect the wires. With a camera one never did understand 
the process, the chemical compounds on the film, the digital 
breakdown of the image. And unlike the hand that wields a 
chisel or that aims a rifle, the hand that raises the camera and 
touches the button does not become skilled. With a camera 
decades ago, there was some manipulation; one had to check 
the light meter, to set the speed and the focus; now the cam-
era does everything. 
And then you wait to see the result. The camera will do 
things the eyes did not: it will flatten the landscape, crowd in 






stretched hands. A stroke of chance presented the enchanting 
fragment and the moment; now a stroke of chance produces 
the image of it in different scaffolding. By chance enchanted, 
or trivialized. You discard or delete 95%, 99% of the images. 
There was the moment of enchantment, of trance; the 
camera only recorded it (transformed, perhaps wretched). 
But the photo image retains its bond with the fragment or 
event that once became pure presence. We look at the image 
of our godmother, immigrant from the old country, standing 
in a field of high grass holding us when we were a six–
months-old baby, and we are transported back to that field 
and the warm bosom of that woman long dead. We look at 
the image of our grandfather, scrawny youth in his uniform, 
who never returned from the Great War, and we are trans-
ported to a place we never have been. Looking over photo-
graphs one has taken over the decades, the years of one’s life 
are transformed into hundreds, thousands, of disconnected 
momentary trances. They are gifts the world gave. They are 
gifts to give others. You go back a few days later to give her 
that photograph you took of the street vendor; she calls her 
children, her mother, you laughing take photos of them to 
give them a few days later. In a far-off land you give your 
friends, the rascally grin a street kid in Calcutta gave you and 
them, the colors a frog in Madagascar gave to the heavenly 
light. 
 
BG & TS: Mesmerized, inspired, and enchanted by the 
depth of your response. It reminds us of experimentation, 
and childhood innocence and exploration, both a call to Her-
aclitus and a new path forward for philosophy. 
In a way, Orson Welles revealed a new cartography, and 
new possibilities for thought, with his search for time. With 
the introduction of depth of field, Welles explored these lay-
ers and recesses, experimenting with the adventures of life 
that comprise our immanence. 





Not yet knowing what was possible, Welles pioneered a 
cinema of time, a new geography, or ethics and aesthetics of 
affects. As Deleuze called it, Welles constructed, or revealed, 
“a little piece of time in its pure state”. Paul Klee, perhaps, 
had something like this in mind, when he suggested we take 
a line for a walk, and this is precisely where we locate your 
unique philosophical expressions. 
As a philosopher, as a traveler on a line of experimenta-
tion, taking a camera for a journey, exploring fields and ter-
rains for philosophical inquiries, or searches, what role do 
you see education, or pedagogical guidance, playing in this 
adventure? Which is to say, do your adventures have peda-
gogical effects? 
 
AL: The terms “education” or “pedagogy” never signified 
much to me, even in the classroom, where I selected books 
that gave me illumination and excitement and shared them 
with young people, regularly receiving, with gratitude, in-
sights from them. 
I first thought about gratitude some thirty-five years ago, 
in France. Gratitude is an action. Giving thanks. When someone 
arrives with a bottle of wine, we look at its color in the can-
dlelight, savor its perfume, pour it into our best glasses, pour 
it to all our guests before we fill our glass. When someone 
gives us a gift, we do not just put it on a shelf and sit down to 
talk about whatever. We receive the gift, it takes time, we 
take it in both hands, take it in with our eyes, turn it about, 
contemplate its features. And we show it, share it with oth-
ers. 
Easter week on the Côte d’Azur, the year that I was 
teaching at the Université de Nice. Chris had taken a break 
from her studies and had come to spend two weeks with me. 
Nice was filled with thousands of especially Parisians who 
had come to escape the dreary end of the Parisian winter on 






ing here, steady, unending rain day after day, and the Parisi-
ans were gloomily drinking bottle after bottle of wine in the 
cafés and restaurants. I had an old VW bug and I said to 
Chris: “Why fight it? Let’s go up into the rain!” We put on 
coats with parkas and got into the car. Chris’s guitar was in 
the back seat. We headed into the Maritime Alps that rise 
abruptly to ice-covered summits behind the city. I was driv-
ing at random, just going up, and at a certain moment no-
ticed a dirt road and drove up it. After some twenty minutes 
it ended at a stone wall some twelve feet high over which we 
saw some rooftops. “It’s a fortified village,” I said. “It must 
date from the sixteenth century when the Mediterranean was 
patrolled by Saracen pirates.” We got out of the car; the rain 
had diminished to a misty drizzle. We found the gate in the 
wall; inside there were some twenty stone houses. Here and 
there, there were breaks in the roofs where the tiles had been 
blown off and broken. “It’s deserted!” Chris exclaimed. We 
wandered down the lanes and came upon a chapel; we were 
able to push open the door. 
Inside, on one wall there were naïve frescos. We were 
silenced, and Chris seated herself on the floor facing the 
simple stone altar. 
After awhile I walked outside and wandered to where the 
terrain was highest. Black clouds were rolling over the ice-
covered mountain peaks and furling down between them like 
ink dropped into water. From time to time there were bolts 
of lightning that blazed across the ice sheets. Then I looked 
down, and far below a break in the clouds had opened a shaft 
of light under which the Mediterranean blue sparkled silver. 
My body standing there felt awkward, unworthy of the gran-
diose heights, and instinctually settled to the ground. My 
eyes gazed quietly into the distances, and from time to time 
my body shifted into one or other of the simple yoga asanas 
that I had learned. My mind was emptied of everything but 
the black clouds and the glaciers. 





After perhaps an hour or so I got up and wandered down 
the lanes of the village. On the other end of the village I 
came upon Chris, seated on a rock softly and intently playing 
her guitar. We had separately realized what grandiose gift 
our eyes had been given, and felt the need to do something to 
receive it, something modestly worthy of it. 
When it was dark we drove back down in silence. Back in 
my apartment, we made sandwiches and opened a bottle of 
wine. After, Chris took up her guitar again, and I heard her 
strumming like she had played on the mountain. I wanted to 
write about this scene which was, I thought, the most gran-
diose my eyes had been given to see. I wrote about it to a 
friend. As I wrote I saw the words were making the scene 
more intense to me and settling it deeper into my heart. My 
letter took a long time, with many crossings-out and re-
phrasings. I realized that I could not share the event on the 
mountains unless I had written as well as I could, written 
better than any lecture on a philosophical text that I had pre-
pared that year. 
It was then that I realized that thought—which is about 
data, about some things or events that are given, which com-
prehends, takes in, what is given, ponders it, feels its weight, 
and produces words that are understandable and open to oth-
ers, that exist for others—thought is gratitude. 
I was in a shikara, a kind of gondola, in Dal Lake in 
Kashmir, as the day came to a close. It was my first trip to 
India, and also the first time I had a camera. I was shy about 
photographing people, thinking it intrusive and objectifying. 
As the boat moved by I had turned my camera to the row of 
willow trees trailing down along the shore. Then suddenly I 
saw in my viewfinder that there were men bathing in the 
river. Embarrassed, I pushed the camera down and looked 
up. But they had seen me, and were waving and shouting 
“Thank you!” I was puzzled, and eventually thought that they 






foreigner had come from afar and instead of photographing 
palaces was photographing poor people. A few days later I 
developed the roll and went to give the men their photos. 
After that I set out to give everyone the photos I had taken of 
them. It was usually easy to find them again: poor people are 
going to be there when you go back, or people who know 
them are. If I was leaving the next day, I could often find 
someone in the area who could write and give me addresses. 
People were visibly delighted when I returned with the pho-
tos; they would treasure photos they could not afford of their 
parents, children, grandparents. I ended up taking fewer 
pictures of buildings and landscapes and more and more pic-
tures of people met at random. I came to experience taking 
photos as essentially giving of gifts. 
I never took slides. I disliked the idea of seating people in 
my house and projecting slides of my trip for them, deter-
mining how long they would have to look at each image. I 
mounted the best pictures in albums; friends would take 
down whatever they liked and view the images as they liked. 
Something to give them pleasure, to give them access to far-
away places, to give them the trust and tact of people from 
far away. When I started putting some photographs in the 
books I published, it was in the same sentiment of offering 
discreet gifts to people I will never meet or hear from. 
 
BG & TS: In terms of photography, do you prefer wide-
angle lenses, or do you achieve this strange familiarity and 
connectedness through an array of telephoto shots? What we 
mean to express is, there is a great sense of humanity in your 
photographs, a suspension of judgement, and an exhilaration 
of intimacy. How do you achieve this level of trust? In many 
respects, Annie Leibovitz managed to capture this closeness 
that we feel in your work, as she photographed her dying 
lover, Susan Sontag. 
 





AL: Trust is taking what is not known as though it were 
known. Every relationship is based on trust, since we do not 
see the intentions, feelings, and motivations of another. With 
someone we have known a long time, or investigated his past, 
we take a number of past behaviors as indication of his future 
and present intentions. But the chance that he or she may say 
or do something different is what makes our encounters with 
others fascinating. 
There is nothing more exhilarating than trusting someone 
of whom one has no past acquaintance, no social contract, no 
language in common. 
When you walk alone in foreign lands, people who glance 
at you are tempted to trust. Because of the intrinsic fascina-
tion and exhilaration of trust. 
Of course walking alone is to go disarmed and disarming. 
Trust elicits trust. The trust that is visible when they stop 
and look at you in the face elicits trust in you. And respond-
ing without wariness or reserve elicits trust in them. 
To really respond to the other involves tact. Tact is the 
light touch that does not seize hold or manipulate or possess. 
It is letting the other be and act in his or her space. It is also 
sensitivity; it is to let the other affect one, with his or her 
curiosity, affection, probings and reserve. In tact one senses 
something of the other’s desires and pleasures. 
Trust is not a matter of photographic techniques. It be-





Some Early Notes Toward  
an Ontology of Fetishes 
by Jeffrey Barbeau 
 
 
We now need an ontology of fetishes, a fetishist on-
tology of things. The substances of things are not 
simply outside us, outside the sphere of human con-
sciousness, and they are not only relations of causal 
determinism between them and the human mind. 
Things, in the structures and substances, attract us 
and inspire us and direct us and organize our move-









For the past eight months I have been involved in an art pro-
ject in which I take a photograph of a moment that typifies 
the general feeling of my day. I envisioned this project as a 
way to take this ongoing and often ineffable process of typ-
ifaction and make it slightly more observable. What this has 
amounted to is a very loose and necessarily imprecise record 
of the emotional tone of my life for the past two hundred 
days or so. My plan is to continue with this project for the 
next two years. An even 730 days. What I hope to achieve is 





What I have gleaned from this series of two hundred photo-
graphs is not so much a predictable series of images that fol-
lows one from the next, but more like a record of subtle and 
not so subtle experiential undulations. Not testaments to a 
resilient and self-identical presence, but rather continuous 
self-differentiation. If photography has long been a tool for 
the biopolitical regulation of life—of documenting identity—
I am currently interested in the capacity of the photographic 
image to explore the novel qualities of duration. Following 





Alphonso Lingis, this is not the record of a sovereign and 
self-legislating subject, but an account of life as we contend 
and actualize ourselves from within the materiality of things, 
vibrations that register on our bodies, rhythms that entice us. 
It is, in short, an openness to the strangeness around and in 
us. For Lingis, 
 
The ceaseless activity of the mind to fix concepts and 
meanings on things appears as an anxious compulsion 
to staunch the leakage of strangeness. The sense of 
strangeness is not a cognitive recognition; it is the ex-
perience of the collapse of cognition, or vertigo, throbbing 




To my mind, this project is not a matter of the simple 
aestheticization of experience. Experience, as I have learned, 
is aesthetic from the very start: as subjects we are co-con-
stituted and emerge as such through our engagement with an 
eventful and sensual field of encounters. Our purview as par-






ducers, for instance) is generated from the continual pro-
ductivity of sensual forces, temporary stabilizations, minor 
modifications, and bouts of real volatility. As Lingis suggests, 
 
A working artist is not one who has an encyclopedic ap-
preciation of artworks but one who has a passionate devo-
tion to materials and forms that speak singularly to him 
or her. An artwork emerging in his hands captivates the 
artist and guides his hand; it goes beyond or goes outside 
whatever meaning that artist has conceived for it. It beck-
ons him toward unknown paths. Are not artworks so 
many scattered sites outside the domain of work and rea-




 In my capacity as a researcher and an artist, I have found 
continual inspiration and creative gumption through a sub-
jection of my thinking to this ‘realm of chance.’ What is 
more, I am constantly intrigued by the role that visual and 
material culture can play in an exploration of this insur-
mountable quality of ‘strangeness’ in our lives. All of the 





photographs included herein are meant to witness our mostly 
mundane, and occasionally exorbitant, emergence from an 
inexhaustible realm of beings and things that both engage 
and exceed our selves. I consider it a modest, tentative con-
tribution to a visual cultural ‘ontology of fetishes,’ a survey of 
our immersion in both built and natural environments. 
 
 
                                                                                                   
 
1 Alphonso Lingis, “Towards An Ontology of Fetishes: An Inter-
view with Alphonso Lingis,” Cultural Politics 5.1 (2009): 115. 
2 Alphonso Lingis, “Strange Emotions in Contemporary Theory,” 
Symploke 18.1–2 (2010): 7. 
3 Alphonso Lingis, “The Voices of Things,” Senses & Society 4.3 
(2009): 279–280. 
 






































































































Objects in Mirror Are Closer  
than They Appear 





Yukultji Napangati’s painting Untitled (2011) is in the Art 
Gallery of New South Wales, and was highly commended 
for the 2011 Wynne Prize. The painting is reproduced here 
[Fig. 1], but the image simply fails to do it justice. The first 
one seems to evoke it better. But this is one of those images 
one must see in the flesh. 
At a distance it looks like a woven mat of reeds or slender 
stalks, yellowed, sun baked, resting on top of some darker, 
warmer depth. A generous, relaxed, precise, careful yet 
giving, caring lineation made of small blobby dots. The 
warmth reminds you of Klee. The lines recall Bridget Riley. 
As you come closer and begin to face the image it begins to 
play, to scintillate, to disturb the field of vision. It oscillates 
and ripples, more intense than Riley. How did I know this 
was a woman artist before I found out who it was? In fact 
this is a painting about, a map of, a writing about, a line of 






Australia, performing rituals and collecting bush foods as 
they went. The painting is a two-dimensional map of an 




Figure 1: Yukultji Napangati, Untitled (2011). 
 
Then something begins. What? You begin to see the 
“interobjective” space in which your optic nerve is entangled 
with the objects in the painting.1 The painting begins to 





paint right in front of you, paint the space between your eyes 
and the canvas. Layers of perception co-created by the paint-
ing and the field of vision begin to detach themselves from 
the canvas in front of you, floating closer to you. This “float-
ing closer” effect is one I associate with the phenomenology 
of uncanniness. The experience you have in a strange place, 
or a strangely familiar place evokes the feeling: objects in 
mirror are closer than they appear.  
The painting gazes. It appears to extrude itself out of the 
canvas towards your face. It does not offer itself up for in-
spection or penetration, like a perspective painting. Instead, 
Napangati’s painting strafes the viewer like a scanner or an 
X-ray machine. It is an unnerving experience, being seen by a 
painting. When I saw it, all the hairs on my arms and my 
friend’s arms stood up, as if they too were caught in some 
crisscrossing electromagnetic field. The painting watches 
you: it does not allow you to form an attitude towards it. In 
this sense, it is almost the absolute opposite of conceptual art. 
You are not permitted to form concepts of any kind. The 
work is more akin to a siren or a warning light than a 
picture-of-something. It beeps at you, scanning you.   
Intersecting shards of patterns within patterns, patterns 
across patterns, patterns floating on top of patterns. A 
constant mutagenic dance between the levels of patterns. The 
painting is a device for opening this phenomenal display. It 
comes lurching towards you, hypnotizing you and owning 
you with its directives of sandhill, women, rituals, bush food, 
walking, singing, lines. You feel gripped by the throat with 
the passion of the imagery. All the hairs on your arms stand 
up and the painting has you in its electromagnetic field. The 
painting dreams. Causality begins. 
What does this mean? I do not access Napangati’s 
painting across a space. Rather, the painting appears to 
abolish the supposed distance between itself and me. The 






supplied by a subject, nor is it a blank screen, nor is it 
something objectively present “in” space. Rather the painting 
emits something like electromagnetic waves, in whose force 
field I find myself. The painting forcefully demonstrates 
what is already the case: space and time are emergent pro-
perties of objects.  
The fact that this fact is common to relativity and to 
phenomenology should give us pause. Perhaps just as 
remarkable is the fact that relativity and phenomenology 
arose roughly synchronously towards the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Just as Einstein discovered spacetime was 
the warped and rippling gravitational field of an object, so 
Husserl discovered that consciousness was not simply an 
empty limpid medium in which ideas float. Consciousness, as 
revealed by phenomenology, is also a dense, rippling entity in 
its own right, like the wavering water of Monet’s contem-
porary water lily paintings: the water that is the true subject 
of those paintings.  
The paintings to which we have grown accustomed pre-
sume a disembodied subject floating in a void, capable of 
imparting meaning to objectively present things. A perspec-
tive painting, for instance, contains implicit instructions for 
viewing, a place from which the painting will render the 
most “lifelike” three-dimensional illusion. The work of the 
painting as such is supposed to vanish without a trace, 
leaving the illusion suspended in front of us for our inspec-
tion. Modernist art attempts to shatter this illusion. But 
Napangati’s painting is not in the illusion making or illusion 
shattering business whatsoever. Pleasing and shocking (thus 
pleasing in a higher key) the bourgeoisie is not on its agenda 
in any sense. The painting destroys the distance necessary for 
the aesthetic illusion to function, yes. But it does not try to 
abandon the aesthetic dimension: far from it. Instead, it takes 
that dimensional all the more seriously. In order to render 
the illusion of a three-dimensional space from which the 





trace of painterly labor has vanished, there has already to be a 
play, a dance of some kind, some sort of phenomenal display, 
like the stage set that enables the actors to strut around. 
Napangati shows us the wiring underneath the normal aes-





The aesthetic form of an object is where the causal properties 
of the object reside. Theories of physical causation frequently 
want to police aesthetic phenomena, reducing causality to the 
clunking or clicking of solid things.2 It is not the case that a 
shadow is only an aesthetic entity, a flimsy ghost without 
effects. Plato saw shadows as dangerous precisely because 
they do have a causal influence.3 When my shadow intersects 
with the light-sensitive diode, the nightlight switches on.4 
When a quantum is measured, it means that another quan-
tum has intersected with it, altering it, changing its position 
or momentum.5 Aesthetics, perception, causality, are all al-
most synonyms.  
When the diode detects my shadow, it perceives in every 
meaningful sense, if we only accept that objects exert an 
aesthetic influence on one another (aisthenesthai, Greek “to 
perceive”). When I am caught in another’s gaze, I am already 
the object of causal influences. Causality does not take place 
“in” a space that has been established already. Instead, it 
radiates from objects. The gaze emanates from the force field 
of a Yukultji Napangati painting. It gathers me into its dis-
turbing, phantasmal unfolding of zigzagging lines and 
oscillating patches.  
Doesn’t this tell us something about the aesthetic dimen-
sion, why philosophers have often found it to be a realm of 
evil? The aesthetic dimension is a place of illusions, yet they 






illusions, then there would be no problem. But, as Jacques 
Lacan writes, “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, 
you don’t know whether it’s pretense or not.”6 Intense yet 
tricksterish, the aesthetic dimension floats in front of objects, 
like a group of disturbing clowns in an Expressionist paint-
ing. If there are only objects, if time and space and, as I’m 
arguing here, or rather gently suggesting, not even so much 
as stating yet, just beginning to evoke, to tune in to the 
possibility that causality is like time and space an emergent 
property of objects—if all these things float in front of ob-
jects in what is called the aesthetic dimension, in a non-
temporal, nonlocal space that is not in some beyond but right 
here, in your face—then nothing is going to tell us cate-
gorically what counts as real and what counts as unreal. 
Without space, without environment, without world, objects 
and their sensual effects crowd together like leering figures in 
some Expressionist masquerade. 
From this point of view, causality is wholly an aesthetic 
phenomenon, involving induction, transduction, seduction, 
whatever-duction. These events are not limited to inter-
actions between humans or between humans and painted 
canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas. They 
happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They 
happen when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They 
happen when a massive object emits gravity waves. When 
you make or study art you are not exploring some kind of 
candy on the surface of a machine. You are studying caus-
ality. The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension.  
Art is important because it’s a direct exploration of 
causality. Post-Newtonian physics involves a lot more than 
just little metal balls clunking one another. Nonlocality, for 
instance, is the fact (a highly repeatable fact, at this point) 
that two particles, seemingly separate, can instantly affect one 
another in some sense.7 Entities interact in a sensual ether that 
is (at least to some extent) nonlocal and nontemporal.8 That’s 





how objects can influence one another despite the fact that 
they withdraw from all forms of access. So when old fash-
ioned art criticism speaks of timeless beauty, it is saying 
something quite profound about the nature of causation, not 
about spuriously universal human values. 
Consider mechanist theories of causation. Machine-like 
functioning, which is what our common prejudice often takes 
causality to be (at least since Newton and Descartes), must 
only be one specific kind of emergent property of some deep-
er nonlocal, nontemporal ocean in which things directly are 
other things. Machines are made of separate parts, parts that 
are external to one another by definition. What causality just 
isn’t is this kind of mechanical functioning, like the metal 
balls in an executive toy. The click of the balls as they hit one 
another is a sound that implies the existence of at least one 
other object—the ambient air that vibrates, causing the click 
to be heard. How come this click or clunk is more real than 
other forms of causality such as attraction, repulsion, magne-
tism, seduction, destruction, and entanglement?  
Clunk causality implies a determinist view: two balls must 
be contiguous with one another, the causality only goes in 
one direction, and there must be at least a necessary, if not a 
sufficient reason for the clunk in the ball that does the 
clunking. Yet when we go down a few levels, we discover that 
quantum behavior is irreducibly probabilistic. What does that 
mean? It means that indeterminacy is hard wired into the 
behavior: it’s not as if we could clean up our way of analyzing 
it and it would then look determined. So there are physical 
reasons why determinism doesn’t work: we’re talking about 
both sufficient and necessary conditions failing at some 
point. It means that Hume is in trouble.9 But there’s another 
big reason not to like determinism. When you have a 
probabalistic fact such as the likelihood that you will get 
cancer if you smoke, and you are a determinist, you can wish 






This is what tobacco companies do. There is no “proven 
link” between smoking and cancer—but that’s evidently not 
the point. Likewise, global warming denial takes a leaf out of 
the determinist notebook. Since there is no obvious link 
between the rain falling on my head and global warming, it 
must be untrue. Or the theory of causality given here is distorted. 
Large complex systems require causality theories that are 
non-deterministic just like very small quantum scale ones. 
Clunking is an illusion that seems to happen to medium-
sized objects such as billiard balls, but only when we isolate 
the clunk amidst a welter of other phenomena. 
The Arabic philosopher Al-Kindi defines all causes as 
metaphorical—apart from God, the unmoved mover, (Al-
Kindi is an Aristotelian theist).10 Al-Kindi did so when my 
ancestors were clunking one another (talking of clunks) with 
crudely fashioned weapons, in the last years of the tenth 
century AD. Causation is metaphorical—that means that 
causes are overdetermined. The balls are held in place by a 
wire frame. The frame sits on a desk. The desk is part of an 
office in a large corporation. All these entities are causes of 
the executive toy’s clunking sounds. Overdetermination, meta-
phor—they mean the same thing. Or, in translation, trans-
lation: metaphor is just Greek for translation, since meta 
means across and -phor means carrying. This is a far more 
suitable way to think causality than mechanical clunking. It 
provides a reason why many forms of empirically observed 
causation are probabilistic.  
Aesthetic-causal nonlocality and nontemporality should 
not be surprising features of the Universe. Forget quantum 
physics: even electromagnetic fields and gravity waves are 
nonlocal to some extent. At this moment, gravity waves from 
the beginning of the Universe are traversing your body. 
Maxwell and others who pioneered the notion of electro-
magnetism imagined the Universe as an immense ocean of 
electromagnetic waves. And then of course there’s the real 





nonlocal deal—the quantum mechanical one. This is when 
the aesthetic shape of an object is what a fruit fly smells (a 
quantum signature), not the volatile molecules themselves. 
Or consider the aesthetic shape of an electromagnetic field 
(how birds navigate, using tiny quantum magnets in their 
eyes).11 Since at this level matter just is information, 
theoretical physics is already in an aesthetic kind of a con-
ceptual space. Even the atomist Lucretius imagined causality 
working through aesthetic “films” emitted by objects.12 But 
of course the arguments here go beyond a fanciful explor-
ation of theoretical physics. They can be applied to any sort 
of entity whatsoever, not just the kind the physicists study.  
One substantial advantage of arguing that causality is 
aesthetic is that it allows us to consider what we call con-
sciousness alongside what we call things and stuff. The basic 
quantum level phenomenon of action at a distance happens 
all the time. Think of a black hole. Are there any in the 
vicinity? Yet somehow you are linked to them. Bertrand 
Russell denies physical action at a distance, arguing that 
causation can only be about contiguous things. If there is any 
action at a distance, he argues, then there must be some in-
tervening entities that transmit the causality.13 Yet isn’t this 
an elegant definition of the aesthetic dimension? Action at a 
distance happens all the time if causation is aesthetic. What 
is called consciousness just is action at a distance. Indeed, we 
could go so far as to say that consciousness-of anything is 
action at a distance. Empirical phenomena such as mirror 
neurons and entanglement bear this out. Minimally, action at 
a distance is just the existence-for-the-other of the sensual 
qualities of any entity.  
In Plato’s time they used to call action at a distance 
demonic. That is, it was the action of demonic forces that 
mediated between the physical and nonphysical realms of 
existence. This is what Socrates says about art in Ion: he 






Muse, goddess of inspiration, to the artist, to the work to the 
performer, to the audience and so on, all magnets linked by 
some demonic force.14 Nowadays we call this demonic force 
electromagnetism, but really it’s remarkably similar to Plato’s 
insight: the electromagnetic wave transmits information over 
a distance; a receiver amplifies the information into music 
coming through the speakers of the PA system. In an age of 
ecological awareness we will come again to think of art as a 
demonic force, carrying information from the beyond, that is, 
from nonhuman entities such as global warming, wind, wat-
er, sunlight and radiation. From coral bleaching in the ocean 
to the circling vortex of plastic bags in the mid Atlantic.  
Now we should not think that this “sensual ether” is some 
kind of adhesive that glues pre-existing “subjects” and 
“objects” together. Nor should we imagine that it is a 
restaurant in which subject and object might finally hit it off. 
Subject and object will never hit it off, for the simple fact 
that the concepts subject and object are prepackaged ontic 
contraband, imported from the long history of ontology.15 
Such a “between” would indeed be a version of “aesthetic 
ideology”: an attempt to reconcile the ugly divorce between 
subject and object.16 Against such an aestheticization, how-
ever, we would be right to insist that the aesthetic is crucial 
to understanding causality. We must therefore distinguish 
rigorously between the aesthetic and aestheticization.17  
Aestheticization is just the conceptual imposition of 
aesthetic concepts onto prepackaged subjects and objects. 
The aesthetic however, is nonconceptual and cannot be 
packaged in this way. Its atemporal nonlocality should alrea-
dy have warned against this. If we don’t wish to load the dice 
in favor of a particular kind of being (say Da-sein, say the 
human) we are left with a simple solution. The aesthetic 
dimension is simply the interior of some object: this is how 
objects are able to encounter one another. When I reach for 
the phone, I do so on the interior of a room. When I reach 





for the phone, I do so on the interior of a solar system. When 
I reach for the phone, I do so on the interior of a universe. 
The “sensual ether,” then, is not like the ether of pre-
Einstein physics at all, or the supposed Higgs field of 
quantum theory’s Standard Model. Such entities allow ob-
jects to float around, have mass, and so on. If we were 
thinking of a physical ether, a quick glance at Locke’s 
devastating assault on the idea of an “ambient fluid” that 
contains all the other entities will set us straight.18 Such a 
physical ether must be composed of ether particles, argues 
Locke: and in what fluid are they floating?  
If, by contrast, the causal “ether” is simply the way one 
entity “dreams” itself or another one, it is constituted by 
these entities as such. When I reach for the phone, I don’t 
imagine myself as an objective subject trying to grasp an 
objective object, like Wile E. Coyote in Roadrunner. Still less 
do I need to imagine myself reaching through a space “be-
tween” prepackaged me and the prepackaged phone. This 
might happen, but only after the phone has gripped me, 
alarming me with its piercing ring or with the thought of 
some person I must call, or seducing my laziness, pulling me 
away from the essay I have to write. In Shakespeare’s Twelfth 
Night, Olivia says, “The clock upbraids me with the waste of 
time.”19 Olivia doesn’t think to look at the clock: the clock 
looks at her. This is what Alphonso Lingis calls the imper-
ative, which we can detect in the way objects demand to be 
handled in specific ways.20  
 
WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DUCK? 
 
There is no such thing as a phenomenologically empty space. 
Space is teeming with waves, particles, magnetic seductions, 
erotic curvature, and menacing grins. Even when they are 
isolated from all external influences, objects seem to breathe 






long rests in a vacuum. To the naked eyes of the observers 
outside, it is breathing: it seems to occupy two places at the 
same time.21 There is already a rift between an object and its 
aesthetic appearance, a rift within the object itself. Causality 
is not something that happens between objects, like some 
coming out party or freely chosen bargain into which things 
enter. It pours constantly from a single object itself, from the 
chorismos between its essence and its appearance.  
An object is therefore both itself and not-itself, at the 
very same time. (“What is the difference between a duck? 
One of its legs is both the same.”) If this were not the case, 
nothing could happen. The uncanniness of objects, even to 
themselves, is what makes them float, breathe, oscillate, 
threaten, seduce, rotate, cry, orgasm. Because objects are 
themselves and not-themselves, the logic that describes them 
must be paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic: that is, the 
logic must be able to accept that some contradictions are 
true.22 Objects are dangerous, not only to themselves, but 
even to thinking, if it cleaves to rigid consistency. If thinking 
refuses to accept that objects can be dialetheic, it risks 
reproducing the dualisms of subject and object, substance and 
accidence, that are unable to explain the most basic 
ontological decision—the one that insists that things are 
objectively present, as they are. The thing becomes imprison-
ed in a philosophically constructed cage, a mechanism, or in 
some kind of ideality that falsely resolves the dilemma by 
shunting everything into a (human) subject. Moreover, 
thinking itself becomes brittle. The more rigorous the 
metalanguage, the more susceptible it is to more and more 
virulent contradictions.23 Thinking should learn from Anti-
gone and bend, like a willow: “Seest thou, beside the wintry 
torrent’s course, how the trees that yield to it save every twig, 
while the stiff-necked perish root and branch?”24 
Phenomenology, then, is an essential cognitive task of 
confronting the threat that things pose in their very being. 





Without it, thinking is unable to break through the tra-
ditional ways of philosophizing that Heidegger calls “sclero-
tic.”25 After phenomenology, we can only conclude that a 
great deal of philosophizing is not an abstract description or 
dispassionate accounting, however adequate these may be, 
but only an intellectual defense against the threatening 
intimacy of things. Moreover, since there is very little diff-
erence between what happens to a light sensitive diode and 
what happens to a human when they encounter a shadow, we 
can only conclude that there is a strange kind of nonhuman 
phenomenology, or, as Ian Bogost puts it, an alien phe-
nomenology.26  
Things can dream one another because they are always 
already not themselves. Not even the thing itself can objectify 
itself. The mud is capable of receiving the dinosaur footprint. 
If it were totally its muddy self in a noncontradictory way, it 
would be opaque, permanent, impervious, “objective.” Cau-
sality happens because a dance of nonidentity is taking place 
on the ontological inside of a thing. The mud muddies: it 
dreams about the dinosaur in its muddy, mud-pomorphic 
way. Napangati’s painting “paintings” me. It doesn’t remain 
in perfect isolation, but sends out dreams of itself that 
intercept me as I walk towards it across the gallery floor.  
I do not encounter patterns and relations that are resolved 
in my mind into paintings, mud, and glasses. These things 
encounter me directly, as themselves. But more precisely, 
every entity throws shadows of itself into the interobjective 
space, carving out its own version of Plato’s cave. It is like the 
poem by Gerard Manley Hopkins:  
 
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame; 
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells  
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s 
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;  






Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;  
Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,  
Crying, What I do is me: for that I came.27 
 
What Lingis notices, however, is that this myself has an un-
canny dimension. Like the person who assures you they are 
being sincere, can we ever really believe that objects don’t 
play tricks with us? Again: “What constitutes pretense is that, 
in the end, you don’t know whether it’s pretense or not.”28 
Duns Scotus speaks of the haecceity of a thing, its thisness, and 
Hopkins translates this into verse.29 Yet the thisness is not 
imposed from without, objectively. It wells up from within. 
Hopkins himself says so explicitly: What I do is me. Quite so: 
it is a case of I versus me. In this difference between a re-
flexive and a nonreflexive personal pronoun, we detect ar-
chaeological evidence of the rift between a thing and its 
appearance. What Hopkins gives us then, if it is a rendering 
of the real, is not a brightly colored diorama of animated 
plastic, but a weird stage set from which things stage their 
unique version of the Liar: “This sentence is false.” To speak 
otherwise is to have decided in advance what things are, 
which contradicts the way the poem itself forces us to exper-
ience things. “Tumbled over rim in roundy wells / Stones” 
are felt and heard before we hear what they have to say for 
themselves against the walls of the well and in the deep water 
within: the first line is an invisibly hyphenated adjective, 
tumbled-over-rim-in-roundy-wells. The adjective takes al-
most as long to read as it might take for an average stone to 
hit the water. The adjective draws out the stone, just as the 
dragonflies “draw flame.” The stone becomes its tumbling, its 
falling-into-the-well, the moment at which it is thrown over 
the rim. Then splash—it’s a stone all right, but we already 
sensed it as a non-stone.  
The very notion of movement involves the paradox that a 
thing is “at once” p and not-p (p ∧ ¬p). If we want to avoid 





Zeno’s paradox, we have to be ready to accept that a 
tumbling stone both is and is not “here.” If we don’t do this, 
the stone will never reach the bottom, because we will be able 
to take smaller and smaller slices of objectified “time” 
thought as a “between in which” the stone sits, now con-
sistently here, now consistently there.30 Motion is not some-
thing that an object “does” on occasion: motion is a deep 
ontological feature of a thing. Thus Napangati’s painting can 
“move” while it hangs motionless on the wall; indeed it can 
“move me” in the affective sense for the very same reason. 
Motion is never a matter of billiard balls rolled across a 
preexisting surface of “space” or “time,” but instead motion 
arises from the rift between a thing and itself, between its I 





When I experience beauty, I resonate with an object. The 
object and I attune to one another. Kant describes beauty as a 
tuning process. “Beautiful” is what I say to myself when an 
impersonal, “object-like” cognitive state arises that seems to 
emanate from the object itself. It is as if the object and I are 
locked together in inseparable union.  
The beautiful object fits me like a glove. Kantian beauty, 
however, is unlike Aristotelian and Horatian decorum.31 De-
corum provides objective rules, an external, systematic set of 
criteria for what counts as beautiful, a checklist. Kantian 
beauty, by contrast, is a symptom of a major discovery of 
something nonobjective. Kant thinks this discovery as the 
transcendental subject, but object-oriented ontology thinks 
the discovery as the withdrawal of objects. In other words, 
what Kant discovers about human beings—that part of their 
nature is sealed from empirical access—applies to non-






ance—which must not (again) be associated with the 
supposed difference between “substance” and “accidents”—
any entity whatsoever has this hidden property. There is 
evidence for this even in Kant himself, as the following 
should show.  
Something in the beauty experience is hidden from me, 
even while I am experiencing it. Beauty is nonconceptual. It 
involves a certain “je ne sais quoi.” Nothing in the object 
directly explains it: not the parts, because this would be sheer 
positivistic reductionism; not the whole, because that would 
be another kind of reduction (the parts are now expendable). 
Yet beauty seems to emanate from this thing. Just this 
particular, unique thing, is the locus of beauty. Everyone in 
their right mind should find it beautiful, I think, yet if I were 
to impose this on others, it would ruin the experience. I 
know my particular experience of beauty is not shared, but I 
know that you know what beauty is. A certain unconditional 
freedom opens up, along with a certain coexistence without 
content. No wonder Kant considered the experience of 
beauty to be an essential part of democracy. Beauty is an 
event in being, a sort of gap, a gentle slit. Beauty allows for a 
cognitive state that is noncoercive and profoundly non-
violent. The master of this realm is Theodor Adorno, whose 
meditations on Kantian beauty are unsurpassed at this time.32 
But what are the conditions of possibility for the exper-
ience of beauty to occur? What, as it were, are the phe-
nomenological physics of beauty? As we explore these con-
ditions we uncover a remarkable body of work. The name of 
this body of work is Alphonso Lingis. It is in the mode of 
Lingis that I have been writing this essay. We may now be in 
a position to see with some clarity the very special place that 
aesthetic events have in the philosophy of Lingis.  
Kantian beauty tacitly presupposes a being that can be 
wounded by colors, sounds, smells, textures and tastes: affec-
ted by them, so as to resonate such that the tuning process of 





beauty can commence. This is not simply a realm of mere 
appetite, as Kant suggests, because that would reproduce a 
difference between humans and nonhumans (animals, for in-
stance) that is untenable and problematic.33 Moreover, in ap-
petite I roam like a hungry wolf over the carcass of things—it 
seems as if powerful objects at the very least suspend this 
aggressive craving, always already suspend it be-fore the 
event of beauty takes hold. And stranger still, as Lacan noted 
well, there is a symmetry between Kantian beauty and 
sadism, a cold lust concerning an infinitely opaque object.34 
Before the gentle slit of beauty is made, then, the knife must 
be ready and the arm must be in range. It is this dimension, a 
dangerous and uncanny dimension of “levels” and “direc-
tives,” that the thinking of Lingis addresses.  
What is called aesthetic distance, then, is a misnomer for a 
nononceptual aesthetic intimacy in which habitual patterns, 
taken as objective fact, are suspended. This suspension does 
not occur around or above things, but rather it emanates 
from the very heart of things. The thing is a suspension of 
itself: the I and me of a thing. Aesthetic distance is not 
“between” an object and another object, or between a subject 
and an object, but rather it lies between a thing and itself 
(“What is the difference between a duck?”). It would be bet-
ter to describe the “distance between” as an aestheticized dis-
tance that has nothing to do with primordial aesthetics, the 
carnival of Liars (“This sentence is false”).  
In a car crash, in an ugly divorce, time seems suspended, 
slow motion. Only afterwards do I start to piece together 
“what happened.” Time as a regular sequence that acts as a 
neutral medium for events is a retroactive positing. The car 
crash, the divorce, is a primordially aesthetic event that has no 
idea what it is while it is happening. Trauma is not some 
empty gap or void within the smooth field of regularly func-
tioning time.35 Rather trauma is the irruption of a “more 






non-contradictions of “everyday life” shatter of their own 
accord. Trauma unmasks regularly functioning phantasms 
(“me,” “my life”) as phantasms. That is precisely why trauma 
is traumatic. It strips the world bare of the illusion that it 
isn’t an illusion, and the accompanying illusion that illusions 
are just candy sprinkles on the surface of a noncontradictory 
cake.  
The aesthetic-causal dimension, then, implies the irre-
ducible coexistence of things. Things are coexistence in their 
being. Things, with all their gaps and inconsistencies, are 
enmeshed with one another. A wire mesh is a network of 
gaps and links. When I pump a bicycle tire, when I look at 
Napangati’s painting, I am enmeshed in a series of inter-
linked emanations of beings. Because of this enmeshment, it 
is not possible to attain transcendental escape velocity from 
things: the very attempt takes place in the context of 
enmeshment. There is no way to peel the enmeshment off 
oneself, since it penetrates into the core of being: beings are 
self-contradictory, themselves and not-themselves. The mesh 
is viscous, as if the wires were made of honey: “The vic-
issitudes of this life are like drowning in a glass pond.”36 The 
very attempt to tear myself away enmeshes me further. Thus 
conscious coexistence with the mesh involves a form of 
nonviolence. At the very least, since every act tears at the 
mesh, and tears me, who is (in) the mesh, it would be best to 
refrain from harm. Translated by Lingis, Levinas quotes Pas-
cal: “My place in the sun is the beginning of all usurpation.”37  
 
BEAUTY IS DEATH 
 
“My place in the sun is the beginning of all usurpation”: even 
my death is a wound to others, not confined to humans. Yet 
the beauty experience is also evidence that there is something 
in me that is not my ego. The beauty experience proves to me 
that there are others. What do we mean then when we say, 





“It was so beautiful I almost died”? Is there more than 
metaphorical truth in this statement? Is beauty an experience 
of death, or near-death? Adorno writes that the shudder of 
beauty shatters the encapsulated subject.38 When an opera 
singer sings just the right note, at just the right pitch and 
volume, the sound waves resonate with the wine glass in such 
a way as to destroy it. On slow motion film, we can see how 
just before it is destroyed, the glass undergoes a shudder, a 
sort of glass orgasm. The resonant frequency matches the 
glass perfectly.  
From the perspective of the alien phenomenology of the 
glass itself, might this indeed be an “experience” of suddenly 
losing a sense of boundary? And isn’t this what beauty is? In 
the event of beauty, a non-self part of my inner space seems 
to resonate in the colors on the wall, in the sounds pouring 
into my ears. Hugely amplified, might this resonance actually 
kill me? “A beautiful way to die”—to be destroyed by vibra-
tions that removed myself from myself.  
For beauty to work, then, there must already be a surface 
capable of receiving the wound. It seems that the knife of 
beauty is able to insert itself into the slit between an object’s 
essence and its appearance. Beauty “works itself in” to the 
already existing rift between an object and that same object, 
the fact that objects are dialetheic, fork-tongued. This rift is 
an inconsistency in the object that enables the object to end. 
It can be thought of as a hamartia (Greek, “wound”), which 
is what Aristotle calls a tragic flaw. When an object is 
entirely sundered from its appearance, its hamartia gets the 
better of it: that is called destruction or death. When I 
disappear into a black hole, you see on the surface an image 
of me that slowly fades. When someone dies, they leave 
behind memories, objects that they have handled, wounds. 
When a realist novel ends, the frequency and duration of the 
action on the page synchronizes ever more tightly with the 






The reader’s heart beats faster as the police mount the 
staircase, only to find the stretched out body of Dorian Gray, 
and a picture of him into which a knife has been thrust.39 A 
dead crow becomes the dust and trees that surround it. 
When a Dzogchen yogini dies, in one of the spaces between 
existences (the Bardo of Luminosity), it is said that she 
allows her being to dissolve into the Clear Light “like a child 
leaping into its mother’s lap.”40 It is said that her being 
shatters like a vase and the space inside the vase merges with 
the space outside. Or she allows her body to disintegrate into 
rainbow light (Tibetan, jalu). From her point of view, is as if 
the body wants to dissolve in this way. Only fragile ego is 
preventing the inevitable from happening. Yet the fragile ego 
is what dies a little in the beauty experience. Beauty is a 
signal from the realm of death.  
Beauty, then, is a nonviolent experience of near death, a 
warning that one is fragile, like everything else in the 
universe. Beauty is the shadow of the threat to objects, the 
threat that is objects. Objects as such carry an inner threat, 
because of the rift between essence and appearance. Beauty is 
the call of the vulnerable flesh and the fragile glass. This 
explains perhaps why beauty is associated with experiences of 
love, empathy and compassion, themes that preoccupy pre-
Kantian theories of aesthetic affect such as Adam Smith, and 
that also preoccupy ethics based on the Buddhist view of 
anattman (no-self).41 It is the reason why we can articulate an 
ethics of nonviolent coexistence based on beauty. This ethics 
cannot truly be grounded in the abstract, rather cold Kantian 
version of aesthetic experience, with its rigid anthropo-
centrism and sadistic shadow side. It must instead be found-
ed in the project laid out by Alphonso Lingis, the project of 
coming as close as possible to our already shared, disturbing 
intimacy.  
Let us return to the question of a flexible, willow-like 
thinking that would be able to move with the torrent of 





things without becoming brittle and breaking, snapped 
because of the hamartia of its very firmness, its attempt to 
remain consistent. Surely then this thinking, which almost 
dies every time it encounters something not itself, is in itself 
a beautiful thinking? Hegel wrote that thinking is the 
encounter with non-identity, and Adorno massively adum-
brated Hegel’s thought.42 Like a Mother Theresa of beautiful 
souls, Adorno’s plea for nonviolence is moving and soothing, 
but somehow it remains an advertisement, a sermon, a cry of 
the heart in a heartless world. Thinking needs to risk its 
sanity a little bit, to put itself in some danger, not endlessly 
postpone the plunge by talking about how much a plunge is 
needed. The time for wringing our hands on the edge of the 
abyss is over, because humans brought about the Anthro-
pocene, a geological period of Earth history marked by the 
deposit of a thin layer of industrial carbon in Earth’s crust 
since 1790, and likewise, before what is known as the Great 
Acceleration, a deposit of a layer of radioactive materials in 
Earth’s crust since 1945. A certain kind of Marxist critique is 
now irrelevant. The world is too much with us, and when 
critique tries to wrench us out it only laments how stuck it is.  
It is in phenomenology that the task of dwelling in non-
identity on non-identity comes about. It is in Lingis, drawing 
on the richness of the phenomenological tradition, that the 
encounter with strangers becomes possible, the encounter 
that, coming close to death by tuning, “saves the Earth.” Lin-
gis thinks beautifully.  
 
                                                                                                   
 
Editors’ note: This chapter’s title is identical to the introductory 
chapter of Timothy Morton’s Realist Magic, published by Open 
Humanities Press in 2013. The content is not identical, however. 
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by Alphonso Lingis 
 
 
Willows, rocks, cascades, clouds, peregrines, dragonflies: real 
things. They are present, in the present. Having left them, 
we find them again. They are where they are, independent of 
us, whether we locate them or not. There are times when all 
our names, categories, and uses for them fade away, and we 
are confronted with their brute reality.1 The urban and his-
torical context of the Place de la Concorde fades away and we 
find ourselves standing on rough stones glistening in the 
rain.2  
Evolutionary biology contests Platonic metaphysics and 
philosophical idealism: our perception of our environment is 
not essentially different from the perception of other biologi-
cal species. Fish, birds, and mammals survive because the 
things they perceive are indeed external to their minds, inde-
pendent of them, and as real as they are. 
Things turn to us one side of themselves at a time. But as 
we stand before an armchair and shift position, this side of it 
tilts up another side and indicates sides to come. To see a real 
thing, and not a fixed surface pattern, is to see it as a cohesive 






We see the front plane of the refrigerator and see its solidity 
extending down the sides and across the back.   
Things are present before us with their pasts and futures. 
A rock retains the shape given it centuries ago by water 
freezing and melting; a tree trunk retains the swerve it took 
decades ago to distance itself from the shade of the adjacent 
tree. Its growth in good season and bad can be seen in the 
rings of its trunk. A corpse retains the expression of resigna-
tion or pain the body felt at the last movements of its life. 
The wall that is green was green and will be green; a 
spread of green that would be there only an instant would 
lack the substantiality of a real thing. The garden bench 
emerges from its past and its substantiality shows its future. 
Descending the canyon, we see its shapes cut by the water 
and the wind that are even now wearing away the path under 
our feet. 
As we walk we see the continually elongating, widening, 
and narrowing sides and stretching or shrinking patterns 
each thing turns to us. As the shifting of the cloud far be-
yond our reach can hold our rapt gaze, so our eyes, without 
surveying, without any practical concern, are absorbed by the 
changing facets of a building, by the turns and swirls of a 
pine as we walk up the hill.  
The reality of things is not confined within their con-
tours. A rock compresses the earth below it and is supported 
in its place by the earth. Under the sun it radiates heat and 
light about itself. A bush crumbles the earth with its roots 
and emits gases into the atmosphere. An abrupt discharge of 
electricity in the storm clouds emits a thunderclap that shat-
ters a goblet in the dining room.  
 
* * * 
 
Things also engender doubles of themselves. Rocks and fenc-






crests of snowdrifts and sand dunes shadow the troughs. The 
brook sends streaks of light downs the reeds and the willows. 
The reeds and the willows flick reflections of themselves into 
the water and into the translucent globes of the eyes of her-
ons, deer, and humans. 
The colors of things bleed out of them to tint or tarnish 
the atmosphere. The shapes of things merge into one anoth-
er to form waves and swells and compressions. The buildings 
radiate their wood or stone tones upon one another and into 
the light and the air, making the atmosphere of one town 
different from another. In twilight the colors of the forest 
disengage from the contours of the leaves and dissolve the 
branches in a miasma of fermenting greens. The metal chains 
and jewels of the matrons in the benefit dinner link up with 
the glitter of the glasses and gleam of the silver. The colors of 
a face do not only outline the surfaces and pores of the car-
pentry of that face, but also interact with one another in the 
brew of a sensual, swarthy, or porcelain complexion. Yasunari 
Kawabata contemplates the strobe dabs of sulphurous glow 
from fireflies on the cheeks and brow of a woman in the 
night garden.3 
Aural images of things move off them. The fruit rolling 
down the roof sends a run of rumble across the ceiling. In the 
bamboo thicket canes flick long thin shrieks into the wind. 
The water splashing over rocks in the brook sends a syncopa-
tion of sputterings over its banks. The fallen leaves send on 
with the breeze the whirr of their slidings and raspings. The 
sonorous images of things, their cracklings, thumpings, and 
thuds link up to form rustlings, rolls, or din. The splash of 
the raindrops echo in the splashes of raindrops all about to 
compose sizzle.   
Many of these emanations are ephemeral while the things 
are enduring, but others endure after the things have passed 






body after it has left; the shale holds the shape of the dino-
saur whose body has long decomposed. 
Things react to these doubles; the moss flourishes in the 
shadow of the building, the grass lifts itself out of the imprint 
of the deer’s body. Things react to their own doubles: bushes 
raise their flowers above their shadows. 
 
* * * 
 
Things cast doubles of themselves upon the surfaces of our 
bodies and upon our sensory surfaces. They cast reflections of 
their colors and shapes upon our eyes, send their reverbera-
tions into our ears, from a distance spread their tang and 
sweetness into our nose and mouth. And things cast the 
doubles that other things cast on their surfaces upon our sen-
sory surfaces. The pond casts the zigzags of sunlight upon 
our eyes; the snow relays upon us the gesticulating shadows 
of the leafless trees.   
Our bodies, like other things, cast shadows on the 
ground, send their reflections on the surface of the pond and 
the window and on photographic film, radiate their colors 
onto other things and into the light and the air. They also 
cast doubles of themselves upon the sensory surfaces of other 
bodies. 
Our bodies also generate doubles of themselves that they 
leave in the past and project into the future. They leave im-
prints of their shape on the bed, on the beach, on photo-
graphic paper. They project doubles of themselves in the 
dance floor at the end of the drive, on the guests awaiting 
them at the wedding feast. 
Our bodies also shadow themselves, have a double per-
ception of themselves. Our eyes see, our hands touch little of 
ourselves. But as we sit, walk, reach for and manipulate 
things, a postural schema takes form in our bodies, holding 






where and how our arms and legs are positioned.  It gives us 
an inner sense of how our legs are extended under the table 
and how our hands are extended groping in the dark. We 
also have a “body-image”: as we sit or walk or reach for 
things, we have a quasi-visual image of how our bodies look 
from the outside. It is not an “image” our mind is imagining; 
it is a perceptual sense of how our body looks as it would be 
seen from a viewing distance outside, which is generated by 
our postural schema. Like a reflection or a shadow cast by 
our postural schema. 
Martin Heidegger argued that perception is intrinsically 
practical; we look about in order to get somewhere and do 
something; we perceive things by moving among them and 
manipulating them. But that is surely wrong: when we sit on 
the deck or walk to the store, we see and hear leaves flutter-
ing to the ground, tree branches zigzagging across one an-
other, birds careening in the sky, clouds drifting, wind gust-
ing, crickets chirping, patterns, rhythms, tonalities, rever-
berations, mists, glows, glimmers, sparkles that we are 
nowise manipulating or using, nowise looking at them in 
view of doing something to them or with them. All that—
lures and ensnares the eyes. 
When captivated by the realm of shadows, reflections, re-
verberations, the I is but a semblance of its active self. It no 
longer focuses, disengages objects and objectives, and launch-
es initiatives. Our eyes and our bodies are moved by the 
rhythm of the reflections of the trees and the clouds swaying 
on the surface of the lake.  As the plane descends, we watch 
the lights of the city spreading across the dark below. We 
arrive at the concert hall, find our seat, survey the audience 
for people we know or know about, look at the musicians 
tuning up, appraise the conductor striding to the podium. 
Then the music begins, the sounds detach themselves entire-
ly from the substances whose metallic or wood or catgut na-






they link up in rhythms and melodies. Our freedom is 
bound, caught up in those rhythms and melodies; we follow 
the music like and with anyone about us. But involvement in 
a rhythm produces an intense sense of presence, an obsessed 
lucidity quite different from the obscurity and indistinctness 
in which habits, reflexes, or instinct operate. 
We feel contentment when the substance of things fills a 
lack or need, a hunger or thirst. We feel satisfaction when 
the things do not obstruct, but lend themselves to our ma-
nipulations. But so much of our pleasure in the world, pleas-
ure in being in the world, is a pleasure in the glows, gleams, 
and halos about things, in the reflections and shadows things 
cast about themselves. Our gaze skips and sways with them, 
attracted and delighted by them.  
These doubles the things generate can also be disquieting 
and threatening. The oversized shadow on the window of an 
intruder. As twilight advances, the shadows advance over 
things, finally engulfing them, but we sense that in the night 
the sonority of the things intensifies and spreads far from 
them while they close in upon us, touch us without being 
seen. 
 
* * * 
 
Artists take up and prolong the fascination of our eyes and 
ears not with the “properties” of things, the shapes and colors 
that are stabilized in their integrated and subsistent struc-
tures, but with the shadows, reflections, auras, and mirages 
the things engender. Photographers capture the mists har-
boring a valley, the light blazing in the hair about a face. 
Music captures in the resonances and movements of sound 
forces that move us, that we receive in emotions.   
 In our lives, in our actions, what we do is ordered—by the 
paths and the obstacles, by the tasks, by the people about us, 






ests, by the sun and the night. There are imperatives, injunc-
tions, directives, prohibitions in the things about us. Enlight-
enment philosophy championed political freedom, from tyr-
anny and oppression, and subsequent philosophy came to 
identify freedom with the very essence of humans.4 But effec-
tive action is ordered by the possibilities and prohibitions 
that the things and the setting contains.  
The shadows, reflections, halos, and reverberations of 
things also appeal to us, summon us, and order us. The spar-
kle of the dewy morning summons us outdoors. The shadows 
of the forest trees invite our footsteps and our rest. The lu-
minous waves and runs of light in the coral sea orders our 
pleasured submission as we move into it and under it. The 
tone and atmosphere of the Zen temple imposes quiet and 
contemplation. Kawabata writes of the sound of the moun-
tain that guided his itineraries, his ascents and his returns.5 
The rumble of the waves in the night orders our heartbeat 
and respiration as we sink to sleep at night. The cries of the 
fledgling bird fallen from the nest appeals to us. The rumble 
of the avalanche prohibits our advance. 
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Alterity and Life in the Thought of 
Alphonso Lingis 
by John Protevi 
 
 
This paper pays homage to Al Lingis’s mastery of key figures 
in the transcendental, existential, and phenomenological tra-
ditions of philosophy. In the works of the 1980s, Phenomeno-
logical Explanations and Deathbound Subjectivity among them, 
Lingis displayed a supreme control in explicating the tradi-
tion, preparing for the breakthroughs that characterize the 
great works written in his own idiom. 
In particular, we will trace two reductions, enabling us to 
see how Lingis identifies three levels of subjectivity. Begin-
ning with the sensibility inherent to intentional conscious-
ness, Lingis performs a “reduction to sensuality,” identifying 
auto-affective consciousness. He then performs a “reduction 
to substantiality,” identifying the condition for hetero-
affective or commanded consciousness. So, from sensibility 
to sensuality, and from there to commanded subjection. Of 
course this is only the order of reasons, if we can put it like 
that, not the order of being, in which the imperative is pri-
mary.  
We will complement our reading of how Lingis performs 






with readings of Michel Henry and of Kant.  
 
FREEDOM, LAW, SENSUALITY, AND SUBSTANTIALITY 
 
“Intuition of Freedom, Intuition of Law,” the last Chapter of 
Phenomenological Explanations (Lingis 1986), provides a fine 
introduction to the two reductions and three levels of subjec-
tivity we mention above.  
Lingis begins with the phenomenology of freedom in 
Sartre: its appearance in affectivity, as anxiety. Juxtaposed to 
this is the Kantian imperative, the “primary and irreducible 
givenness of law” (Lingis 1986: 103). The theoretical use of 
reason is commanded to represent a lawbound nature, com-
manded by the form of law itself, not by any sensible intui-
tion. Further, practical reason is commanded to think itself 
free of natural mechanism, but that means freely bound to 
construct maxims that take the form of lawbound nature. 
But, by returning to Sartre, we see how Kant’s imperative 
to conceive practical reason in the form of lawbound nature 
falters once one takes into account the irreducibility of an 
embodied perspective: “once one sees the perspectival struc-
ture intrinsic to any cognitive as well as to any practical field, 
one understands the structural necessity of the perceptually 
inobservable observing body, of the unmanipulatable ma-
nipulator-body” (Lingis 1986: 105).  
But Sartre cannot explain how positing goals can “activate 
the executive forces of the material body,” a lacuna to which 
Lingis brings the corporeal schema and inextricability of ac-
tion and perception of Merleau-Ponty to address (Lingis 
1986: 106).  
But having found the origin of action in the capacities of 
the lived body, what then of constraint, force, law, impera-
tive? “One has to perceive things, has to perceive the world” 
(Lingis 1986: 107). Hence Lingis’s pointed question: have 





Sartre and Merleau-Ponty escaped describing pre-reflective 
experience on the model of reflective experience?  
Here Lingis makes one of his signature moves. Let’s call 
it the “sensual reduction.” Calling on Levinas (although we 
will use Henry as our point d’appui), he writes, “there is con-
sciousness that is not conscious of some thing. There is sen-
sibility that is not prehension of a form. There is sensuality in 
our sensibility . . .” (Lingis 1986: 107).  
The sensual reduction in turn brings Lingis to his second 
reduction: that of sensuality to substantiality: “The sensuous 
element is not schema but substance; it supports us, sustains 
us, is sustenance, its content contents us” (Lingis 1986: 108). 
Lingis stresses again and again in his work that the con-
sciousness of sensuous substantiality is auto-affective, not in-
tentional.  
But such auto-affectivity—which cannot be seen as ec-
static reaching out, but as “being-in one’s own substance”—
doesn’t let us escape imperatives: “action is demanded” (Lin-
gis 1986: 109). And action is not just making up lacks felt in 
auto-affection. Action is not generated merely by hunger. 
Action takes place in a world. “Why? What is this imperative 
that makes our existence a being-in-the-world” (Lingis 1986: 
109).  
And here is the spot for the appearance of the other in 
Kant: “respect for the other is respect for the law that rules in 
another” (Lingis 1986: 110). Which is also the point of entry 
of Levinas, who challenges the Kantian imperative in its uni-
versality, changing it to singularity: “the force incumbent on 
me: an appeal that singles me out, a command that orders 
me” (Lingis 1986: 110; italics in original). 
It’s this imperative that founds the subject not as “subject 
of sensuous enjoyment” but as “subjected to an imperative.” 
This is the subject of hetero-affectivity, the subject as consti-
tuted in subjection, in assujettissement: “the position of being 






 . . . . We have argued that being-in-a-world . . . presupposes 
subjection to an imperative” (Lingis 1986: 111).  
Which is to say that we are commanded to be free: “the 
freedom of [the] agent is not given in a primitive intuition 
independent of the world or [independent] of the imperative 
that requires a world” (Lingis 1986: 112). 
Although there are many nuances to be added, we can 
recognize many of the lines of thought characteristic in 
Lingis’s work in this brief sketch.  
 
FORECAST OF THE REMAINDER OF THE PAPER 
 
At this point, I’d like to pick up on two points on the nexus 
of alterity and life in Lingis’s thought. This will show the 
great precision and density of Lingis’s thought by explicating 
at length what he distills into sentences: 
 
1. The notion of the inaccessible other thought on the 
basis of pure auto-affectivity, in Michel Henry, as a 
counter-point to Lingis’s notion of subjection, of het-
ero-affectivity as auto-affectivity broken by the appeal 
of the other. 
 
2. Kant’s description of the respect of the law in the 
other, as we see it in Lingis’s reading, in “Images of 
Autarchy,” Chapter 2 of Deathbound Subjectivity (Lin-
gis 1989). This hetero-affectivity occurs in and as 
pain, as the thwarting of the life force.  
 
MICHEL HENRY AND THE AUTO-AFFECTIVITY OF LIFE 
 
In Material Phenomenology (2008), Henry insists that classical 
phenomenology aims at the transcendental conditions of 
possibility of manifestation or appearance, that is, how things 
appear (not what appears). For Henry, “classical” or “histori-





cal” phenomenology is based in the claim that things appear 
as constituted by intentional acts, what he will call being 
“thrown into the light of the world.” Intentionality is thus a 
condition of possibility of appearance; in other words, inten-
tionality is a transcendental feature of subjectivity. But is in-
tentional, constituting, subjectivity—transcendental subjec-
tivity—itself such an object? We risk an infinite regress with 
a positive answer: it seems that making intentional subjectivi-
ty into an object requires another subjectivity to whom that 
objectified subjectivity appears. 
In Material Phenomenology Henry also subjects Husserl’s 
treatment of self-awareness to a careful reading, concluding 
that Husserl fails to isolate the auto-affection” of life as the 
true way in which subjectivity manifests itself; this failure 
necessitates a new, “radical” phenomenology.  
For Henry, “auto-affection” is the purely immanent feel-
ing that living beings have of the concrete modes of their life. 
One of Henry’s prime examples is pain: pain is revealed in 
and through its very passive givenness: there is no intentional 
object constitution in the experience of pain, just pain as a 
purely immanent experience of life revealing itself to itself: a 
self-manifestation or self-appearance. The emphasis is on the 
way the auto-affection of life is the self-manifestation of sub-
jectivity; intersubjectivity, in turn, is rooted in a “shared pa-
thos” of life. This is the point of contrast with Lingis’s work, 
in which intersubjectivity is founded in hetero-affectivity, in 
the imperative issuing from the other. 
Henry addresses intersubjectivity via a reading of the Car-
tesian Meditations. For Henry, Husserl’s descriptions of the 
constituted ego, which is used as the basis for the “appercep-
tive transfer” with the alter ego (Henry 2008: 109), misses 
the “original” ego self-given in auto-affection (Henry 2008: 
108). Rather than a “phenomenology of perception applied 
to the other” (Henry 2008: 114) we should recognize our 






ence or absence, solitude, love, hate, resentment, boredom, 
forgiveness, exaltation, sorrow, joy, or wonder” (Henry 2008: 
104).  
The problem comes with the reduction to the sphere of 
ownness in Cartesian Mediations 5. Here Henry will oppose 
the (“true”) transcendental Ego with the “constituted ego” 
that is the basis for Husserl’s analysis (Henry 2008: 108). 
Here we see a “demotion of the original Ego to the rank of a 
psychophysical ego appearing in an objective form in the 
world of my sphere of belonging” (Henry 2008: 110). Now 
we must be careful to remember that for Henry “the light of 
the world” is his term for intentional constitution: the origi-
nality of self-manifestation is “deposed” in the reduction to 
the sphere of ownness. The elements of the sphere of own-
ness “are deposed in the sense that appearing, which is the 
basis of their being . . . is their appearing in this first world of 
ownness” (Henry 2008: 106).  
Following the thesis of ontological monism, this “first 
world of ownness” is still a world for Henry; it presupposes 
yet forgets the non-worldly, non-appearing auto-affection of 
life. As a result of this demotion, “the worldly ego in the 
primordial sphere of ownness functions as the pivot of the 
pairing association with the body of the other” (Henry 2008: 
110).  
Henry claims that in focusing on the constituted ego 
Husserl also enacts a “demotion of the body” in which “the 
body is no longer the radically subjective and immanent “I 
can” that I am and that is identical to my ego” (Henry 2008: 
110). The key thesis, again, is that constitution is not prima-
ry self-manifestation: “It [the constituted body] is shown in 
ownness but not in itself” (Henry 2008: 110; italics in original).  
The fundamental problem for Henry is that Husserl does 
not examine the true reason why the other can never be pre-
sented, but only appresented. From the fact that “every sub-
jectivity understood in its original way . . . escapes from every 





perceptual presentation” (Henry 2008: 112) we should not 
conclude, as do Levinas and Derrida, that the other is too 
much an other to be presented.  
Rather, Henry will insist, “it is not because the alter ego is 
an alter [that it escapes perception]; it is because the other is 
an ego that I cannot perceive the other in itself” (Henry 
2008: 112–113). That is because the true ego, the transcen-
dental Ego that is the “Ipseity” of transcendental Life, can 
never “appear” in the “light of the world,” but can only self-
manifest in auto-affection.  
 
KANT AND THE PAINFUL THWARTING OF THE LIFE-FORCE 
 
In the Critique of Judgment (“General Comment on the Ex-
position of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments”), Kant distin-
guishes the purely mental “feeling of life” [Lebensgefühl] from 
physical “life forces” [Lebenskräfte] (Kant 1987: 274); upon 
this distinction rests the entire critique of aesthetic judgment, 
which must distinguish empirical or physical interest in an 
object’s possible effects on our health (physical life forces) 
from aesthetic disinterestedness focusing on the pure mental 
stimulation (mental feeling of life) occasioned by the presen-
tation of an object. We can contrast this duality with the uni-
ty described in Critique of Practical Reason, where “pleasure 
always affects one and the same life-force [Lebenskraft] which 
is manifested in the faculty of desire” (Kant 1956: 23). 
The feeling of life is affected in all registers corresponding 
to our higher powers: judgment, understanding, and reason. 
In addition to the pleasures and pains associated with aes-
thetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime, we also 
experience cognitive and practical feelings. We feel a cogni-
tive pleasure in discovering a harmony of laws of nature with 
our cognitive power, since we can unify heterogeneous em-
pirical laws of nature under principles (Kant 1987: Introduc-






Practical feeling, on the other hand, is twofold: we feel 
pain in the thwarting of the inclinations in the face of the 
moral law, but this very pain will produce respect for the 
moral law as a “positive feeling” (Kant 1956: Part I, Book I, 
Chapter III, 73–74). We will pursue the connection of pain 
and the moral law as it plays out in the Critique of Teleologi-
cal Judgment. 
The teleological judgment of nature’s purpose feeds into 
Kant’s thought of the organism, turning it towards a theo-
bio-politics. While the cultural production of man’s capaci-
ties for purposiveness is the ultimate purpose of nature here 
on earth (Kant 1987: ¶83, 431), the final purpose of nature, 
that in virtue of which nature is planned, can only exist out-
side nature, in man as moral subject (Kant 1987: ¶84, 435; 
¶86, 443). The purposive intelligence that would have the 
possibility of man’s morality as its final purpose in arranging 
natural order must be a moral God. Thus nature and free-
dom are finally related in the thought of a moral architect 
God, a “legislating sovereign in a moral kingdom of purpos-
es,” who guarantees that nature must at least cooperate with 
our moral action (Kant 1987: ¶86, 444).  
The key to understanding this aspect of Kant’s thought is 
to consider culture. We must distinguish the culture of skill 
from the culture of discipline while at the same time search-
ing for the connection to Gewalt as force, violence, and au-
thority. The culture of skill prepares our capacity to set our-
selves purposes, while the culture of discipline is negative, 
consisting in the “liberation of the will from the despotism of 
desires” which “rivets us to certain natural things” necessary 
for our biological survival, that is, the furthering of our life 
forces (Kant 1987: ¶83, 432).  
In the culture of skill we are riveted to pleasure; freedom 
comes only through self-chosen pain. Nature has given us 
our impulses so we would not “neglect or even injure our an-
imal characteristics” (Kant 1987: ¶83, 432).  





With the culture of discipline however, we can develop 
our freedom to “tighten or to slacken, to lengthen or to 
shorten” our impulses “as the purposes of reason require.” In 
an interesting twist, the way to the rule of reason is prepared 
by the pleasure of fine arts and sciences, which “make great 
headway against the tyranny of man’s propensity to the sens-
es and so prepare him for a sovereignty in which reason alone 
is to dominate [Herrschaft . . . in welcher die Vernunft allein 
Gewalt haben soll]” (Kant 1987: ¶83, 433).  
Those purposes of reason are the painful establishment of 
the moral law as the ground of action in a person, as we learn 
in the Critique of Practical Reason. The establishment of the 
moral law as ground of action, “by thwarting all our inclina-
tions, must produce a feeling which can be called pain,” while 
the moral law, as positive in itself, commands respect in 
“striking down, i.e., humiliating, self-conceit” (Kant 1956: 
Part I, Book I, Chapter III, 73).  
The pain of humility must be self-chosen, as Kant makes 
clear in discussing humility, “a sublime mental attunement, 
namely voluntary subjection of ourselves to the pain of self-
reprimand” (Kant 1987: ¶28, 264). Here we see the political 
affect of morality parallel that of the sublime: the violent, 
painful striking down of our natural body will rebound to 
reveal a supersensible vocation.  
In his moral philosophy, Kant objects to the propensity to 
make our subjective grounds of choice into an objective de-
termining ground of the will, self-love, a propensity that can 
even attempt to make our self-love into law, the condition 
Kant calls self-conceit. Respect for the moral law reasserts 
the proper role of the rational moral law as sole legislator of 
the kingdom of practical reason. Respect for the moral law is 
a disciplinarian that through sublimely painful self-humil-
iation prevents the revolution that would place self-love in 
charge. 






purely rational will and the feeling of respect for the moral 
law are ultimately pleasurable is a difficult question. Just like 
the indirect pleasure of the sublime, a certain pleasure at the 
prospect of rational self-governance is produced on the basis 
of the immediate effect of pain produced by the moral law’s 
effect on inclination. However, focusing on these immediate 
effects, Kant writes in the Critique of Practical Reason that 
“respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that one 
only reluctantly gives way to it as regards a man” (that is, rec-
ognizing the morality of others is also painful to us) (Kant 
1956: 77).  
Whether or not the feeling is that of pleasure, the focus 
on the rule of reason and the painful stifling of inclination is 
clear. In other words, whether Kant’s political affect of self-
chosen pain, of sublime humility and the moral crushing of 
the inclinations, is ultimately hedonic is questionable, but 
that it is dolorous through and through is clear.  
And here, of course, at the point linking pain and im-
perative, is where Lingis will call upon Nietzsche and joy, 
Nietzsche and the love of the world, as other affects. Let’s 




What have we seen in expanding upon these two themes: 
auto- and hetero-affectivity, and the pain of the moral law? 
The readings show, with regard to the nexus of alterity and 
life, the depth and density of Lingis’s thought, which distills, 
without sacrificing precision, whole dimensions of the 
thought of great philosophers. This distillation provides to 
Lingis’s works of the 1980s their unique power, affecting us 
from within by a challenge from without, moving us, chang-
ing our lives. 
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Three years have passed since you first asked me to write 
about Al Lingis and his correspondence with friends over the 
past forty years. Sixteen years have passed since Wolfgang 
Fuchs and I gathered together the first 20 years of Al’s let-
ters, with the intention of providing a sourcebook for re-
searchers. Letters from a Nomad Philosopher (mss) compiled 
over 200 letters written between 1973 and 1995. Right now 
it sits on the floor before my fireplace, scattered around me in 
folders with headings like Flesh, Fun, and Friendship; on 
People and Philosophers; Birth and Death. It sits before me 
now much like the final exams that were spread around the 
floor in front of fish tanks and wall-to-wall bookshelves at 
Al’s house in State College, 1972. As a graduate assistant for 
one of his big introductory classes, we were grading, holding 
pass or fail thumbs like the young Caesars we felt to be. Only 
then, as I recall clearly, when we would utter disgust at a 
piece and move it towards a would-be-fail pile, Al’s hand 
would dart forward and intercept. A few quick searches and 
he would find a passage to read us, and surround its reading 
with evocations of tenderness, liveliness, loveliness, and look-
ing up at us staring at him blankly utter something like “bril-
liant, don’t you think?” 
I have never forgotten that occasion. These utterances 
came as epiphanies to me—sudden and momentous hammer 
blows upon my way of thinking about things and people in 
terms of grades, of arrangements into piles, categories, and 
pigeon holes. To this day whenever I find myself before a 
situation calling for a sharp judgment, one usually bearing 
nasty outcomes, if I just pause enough a little voice will arise 
in my mind with a lovely refrain that dissembles any tension 
of the moment: “brilliant . . .” 





Many others have been affected by Lingis over the years. 
Stellar observations can be found in the lovely homage com-
piled by Alex Hooke and Wolfgang Fuchs Encounters with 
Alphonso Lingis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003). An 
exceptional take on his own books can be found in Mary 
Zournazi’s interview with Lingis for Radio Eye in Australia 
(1999) [http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/radioeye/Foreign9.htm]: 
 
I don’t think I have a policy statement on writing, but 
I do have some feelings. I have thought that the task 
of philosophical writing is to address yourself to some 
reality and for it to be in your own terms . . . I think I 
felt that very intensely the first time I went to India – 
when I went to Calcutta to stay for several months. I 
was afraid of Calcutta and it had the reputation of a 
city dreadful at night. I arrived in the evening and as 
soon I booked into a hotel I immediately always went 
out . . . 
 I somehow had always felt—it was an idea that I 
found in Nietzsche—that suffering does not exceed 
human capacity . . . and that is something I verified in 
a very personal experience with my mother’s dying. It 
was an almost unbearable thing to watch, but she bore 
it with great strength and courage—and that made me 
believe that one does have the strength. But months 
later in Calcutta, the last night I was there, I took an-
other midnight walk—I wept, really wept.  
 
Lingis would write of death in many of his works, culmi-
nating in the big book Deathbound Subjectivity, the subject 
itself often introduced by the deaths of his mother, col-
leagues, students, more often presaged new friendships. 
 
One day in Mahabalipuram, I felt death come for me. 






gth that once climbed the cliffs to see the cave-tem-
ples of Ajanta; within a few hours a microbe that had 
entered my veins through some prick too tiny to locate 
had drained all my strength . . . In the ten days that 
followed . . . I got sicker . . . Then one night I awoke 
from a fever to find my rib-cage rigid, my compressed 
lungs wheezing and choking . . . then I felt myself be-
ing lifted . . . by a small figure of a man clad only in 
rags. He took charge of me. He came with a cart, 
hoisted me on it, dragged it through the bush, located 
a rickshaw from someone he roused in the night, ped-
aled me through the jungle road, found a boat in the 
village by the sea, roused the owner, and laid me on it, 
then paddled it through the sea whose waves roared 
about us . . . He dragged me to the clinic in Madras. 
Then he left without saying a word. I would never see 
him again, no letter from me would ever find him. 
 A youth from Nepal who rowed through the 
storming sea with a stranger, and departed; this 
seemed to me a kind of nomadism radically different 
from the nomadism our inordinate excesses of indi-
vidual value and commodity values makes possible . . . 
The further one goes one finds oneself only the more 
in oneself, the more wearied with the weight of one-
self. The true nomadism is rather that which drives 
one, when one goes far, not to find, on each new shore 
on which one arrives, someone with whom one shares 
a language, a belief, or practical concerns, but to find 
someone with whom one shares nothing, the stranger, 
and, reduced to the solitude in which one has been 
mired by contracting an existence of one’s own, one is 
delivered by the carnal arms of a stranger. If one starts 
with this access to the other, outside of all contracts, 
one will then hear the thoughts and see the perspec-
tives and glimpse the visions of another land, without 





the inevitable deviation and misunderstanding and 
parody, the unending Western recoding. One would 
know depaysment, one would find oneself elsewhere.1  
 
I remember that first trip for Lingis to India. I received 
an Aerogramme, and later a photo—writing on the back; the 
first of many to follow over the years. 
Verily, brilliant indeed! I had written him seeking advice 
about my own all important dissertation back at Penn State. 
He unmanned my logic with a snapshot. Eventually these 
photo journalistic entries would become full-blown 9X12 
glossy photos accompanying his annual end-of-the-year New 
Year greetings letter. Many would preface chapters in his 
books, mirroring the encounters with the strangers that sus-
tained his jour-neys. 
Tom, I write you 39 years later. I have carried those let-
ters. They sit now before me, each one alive with dormancy. 
Whether it is a thought about a person or place, a shark or 
volcano, a simple sentence or diatribe, something would 
erupt with brilliance. 
Introducing us to his essays in Abuses, Lingis said 
 
These were letters written to friends, from places I 
found myself for months at a time, about encounters 
that moved and troubled me. . . . 
 The letters were almost never answered, maybe 
never read. Nowadays people only write letters to rec-
ord requests, transactions, and detailed explanations, 
or to send brief greetings; when they want to make 
personal contact, they telephone. Conversation by tel-
ephone communicates with the tone and warmth of 
the human voice, but what has moved one deeply can 
only be shared through language when one has found 
the right words. Finding the right words takes 






 It is hard to share something only with words on a 
silent page. As the places and encounters reverberated 
in my heart, I found again and again they had not 
been said with the right words. What I wrote about 
them finally became too long to send to anyone. I will 
again find they have not been said with the right 
words.2 
 
WE are ALL Friends in his Letters. I have always been an-
other address. My first letter from Lingis came in 1973, writ-
ten from Nice where he was raving about Deleuze who had 
just published his essay on Nietzsche entitled “Nomad Thou-
ght” and the urge to de-codify codes of dominant culture. 
Lingis certainly has followed this call to Philosophy, this im-
pulse to cross borders; the scream to hammer them with tun-
ing forks. He travels to places sometimes familiar, most oft 
strange; to peoples even farther by cultural bounds, yet near 
in common human grounds. Where grandeur and absurdity 
dwell together: in this world. Here, the letters are perhaps 
more direct and immediate than the published works. The 
letters bespeak first encounters, words written to give friends 
the excitement of having seen and experienced something 
firsthand. They are first attempts at making intelligible what 
nomadic Lingis perceives before the codes of conventional 
wisdom obscure. 




chers amis—Michigan it is. The winter desolation, 
white serene, death, the gaping black hole before 
which being agonizes turns out to be made of tiny 
white crystals, each one different, sterile, infinite bea-
uty. I’m afraid the hope we had that you would be 
shaped, by education, by grades, by judgments, by 





sanctions, into a Heideggerian de l’obsérvance stricte is 
going to flicker out, in that vast uncontrollable soli-
tude. Wherever is Albion? The old Swedes with the 
prairie-dog eyes, knuckles color of barley, each one an 
Attila grimly reaping the yellow horizons? Lutherans, 
performing, as spiritual exercise, biological necessities 
in wooden back shacks while abominating the pope in 
Rome? Their sons in wooden benches in front of you, 
in rough jeans, the acrid smell of horses, hot horse 
muzzles, first masturbation in a stable, against the leg 
of the roan filly? Their daughters, nails unpainted, but 
hands still colored with the juice of boysenberries and 
black currents [sic]? Firm, pulpy breasts, big tits, not 
like your California nymphs, inconsistent with their 
heads full of theosophy. Here the purple colors of 
German sin, Faust and Luther, being replaced, these 
days, just with health, with those big tits and the 
Northwest air? My God, you sure as hell are out to 
teach them! You are going to educate yourself, won-
derfully, I’ll wager passing down to them all the dia-
monds in your course syllabuses. Plato–Johnstone–
Nietzsche–Kandinsky—what is wanting? What is this in-
definable lack, that something missing, that I none-
theless sniff at while reading through your class sylla-
buses? Sade, I suppose, or better the really sick Austri-
an Sacher-Masoch, Reich, Cioran, Genet, the factor 
of evil, sickness, the cancer on reason, the stinking ef-
fluvia. You will, coquettishly, answer that it is you 
yourself who will introduce that dimension. (Better, 
you should shrug your shoulders at the sick Rivieran 
who is writing to you, and look out at them, health, 
vigor, courage, endurance, confidence, the aching balls 
in those blue jeans, the big tits.) And you say they’re 
rich yet! Old man driving bulldozers across forests, ten 






hundred black angus steers? As one who woefully has 
never been able to leech to any degree worth mention-
ing off students, and in fact have only once had one 
who was a genuine millionaire, himself. Yet what pro-
fession is more akin to state of mind, in that willing-
ness to listen to, but not believe, everybody’s story, 
bringing up the big words that flatter, that being in 
the street, where the men who do business with life 
are, that adding, at each visit, that little riff about love 
and eros and all that is de rigueur—what profession is 
more akin to that of the philosophy professor than 
that of the common harlot? Tant mieux si les clients 
sont riches . . . I am now full of projects—the top ones 
are to get with it on my real life-destiny, my real voca-
tion, just now lucidly, fully recognized: to spend my 
life to make Levinas known. So, I am thinking about a 
small book, in completely accessible language, explain-
ing what he has seen about eroticism. Then, scholarly, 
treatise-format, a study of temporality in Heidegger 
and Levinas. For Levinas, I recognize now, has a 
completely new idea about the internal format of pre-
sent, past and future (the presence of the present, the 
passing-away of the past, the surprise of the future), as 
well as about temporalization itself, the synthetic unity 
that forms there, which he no longer seats in the con-
cept of existence. This is very new I think.  
 
To praise Lingis, to adulate, is sheer sycophancy. I plead 
nolo contendere. I am simply a flatstone, an altar upon which 
to worship; or to cut up dead fish. To criticize, to dispose, is 
sheer idiocy. Have you been there? The eros of Khajuraho, 
hallucinogenic nights of Borneo, Ulan Bataar, Mali, San Sal-
vador, Cusco; the ice hotel, Pattaya transvestite bars? All of 
these on their New Years? This feature of his writing both 
attracts and frightens something in us. His descriptions have 





both their allure and their horror. Maybe that’s why his let-
ters are attractive: safely morphed accounts from the simula-
crum. In a letter to Georges Brandes Nietzsche wrote “To 
my friend. George! Once you discovered me, it was no great 
feat to find me: the difficulty will be to lose me.” If you find 
Lingis he will charm you. If you take him seriously, he will 
disarm you. Either way you could become obsessed, pos-
sessed; then again dispossessed and consumed. Does it mat-
ter? Isn’t that akin to the advice Zorba the Greek gave to 
[his] boss: “a man needs a touch of madness, or he never dare 
cut the rope.” Reading a letter from Lingis is a good start. 
Reading several letters might suck you in. As Nietzsche in-
vited, “Either we have no dreams or our dreams are interest-
ing. We should learn to arrange our waking life in the same 
way: nothing or interesting”3 (Gay Science #232). 
I leave you to your own readings. Here are a few of the 
early letters. I append scanned versions of a couple aero-
grammes, mostly to highlight the precision and the economy 
of Lingis as typist. By 1988 he had a laptop when traveling 





                                                                                                   
 
1 Alphonso Lingis, “Being Elsewhere,” in Falling in Love With Wis-
dom: American Philosophers Talk about Their Calling, eds. David D. 
Karnos and Robert G. Shoemaker (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
2 Alphonso Lingis, Abuses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), vii. 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1974), 212. 
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by Joff Peter Norman Bradley 
 
 
This essay mines the phenomenal oeuvre of Alphonso Lingis 
to explicate his theory of communication. It is argued that 
there is such a theory and it is one intimately and inextricably 
linked with a philosophy of community. Cartographically 
and genealogically, to chart how his theory of communica-
tion has taken shape, I shall draw on a number of thinkers 
who have informed his thought over the years. While com-
pleting such a task presents formidable exegetical challenges, 
this essay claims that while Lingis indeed has a theory of 
communication, it is one synthesized and inflected by an ec-
lectic reading of continental philosophers such as Bataille, 
Deleuze and Guattari, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Nie-
tzsche, among others.  
However, this foray into the thickets of his dense and 
richly descriptive prose aims not to reproduce verbatim what 
Lingis has penned in his translations, numerous lectures, 
books, and monographs, because extrapolating a consistent 
theory is a difficult, nigh impossible task to accomplish, giv-
en, and by his own omission, Lingis’s thought-experiments 
do not always form a consistent whole. And in another way, 






writings of Lingis into some form of pristine totality: to say 
terminally what he should have said, to say at the end yes that 
is what he meant. His writings are best understood if the 
reader appreciates his monographs are honed in to a particu-
lar time, place, and ethical moment. His thought-exper-
iments are sometimes performative and material, primed for 
a particular muse on the nature of things. It is therefore diffi-
cult to think Lingis as writing an oeuvre of a single trajectory 
across time and space. His writings are specific to location, 




Levinas’ influence on Lingis cannot be underestimated. It is 
difficult not to hear Levinas’ voice when one reads Lingis. 
Indeed, Lingis discerns in Levinas a philosophy of limits, a 
philosophy of the limits of language, the limits of the said. 
Lingis, following Levinas, scrutinises the idea of non-rela-
tionality to the other. The other is irreconcilable difference, 
beyond commonly held bonds and shared thoughts, on the 
thither side of das gerede. For Lingis, the fundamental rela-
tion of the self to the other is prior to that which is common. 
Heterogenic difference to alterity is pre-ontologically ethical. 
There is an inescapable appeal before any information is bar-
tered or shared. 
Today theories of communication induce us to depict the 
others about us as agencies with which we exchange infor-
mation. But when we actually communicate with people 
about us, the exchange of information is the least part of our 
conversation; most of the time we utter words of welcome 
and camaraderie, give and receive clues and watchwords as 
how to behave among them and among others, gossip, talk to 
amuse one another. The other is evidently there, a person, for 
us not as an agency that issues meaningful propositions, in-






Lingis investigates the intrusive horror and overwhelming 
proximity of the other. The relation to the other is one of 
exposure, vulnerability, and sensibility. Above all, the ‘I’ is 
essentially contested by the other and is irrevocably responsi-
ble. The relation is one of precarity. The proximity of the 
other implies the suppression of ethical distance, as one is 
bound to reciprocate and respond. The self is fissured. Sub-
jectivity is constituted heteronomously as the other is an-
archical. For Lingis, the self-legislating, autonomous subject 
of Western reason is undermined in such a non-relation to 
the other, and subjectivity is subjection to the infinite de-
mands of the other, to an uncertain compassion.2 As he says: 
“Thought is obedience; subjectivity is constituted in subjec-
tion."3 And again, in discussing the defenestration of Gilles 
Deleuze, Lingis writes: “Becoming someone who stands on 
his or her own and speaks in his or her own name—
subjectification—is then subjection and subjugation.4 
The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to 
anything said. For Lingis, as for Levinas, language is precise-
ly the expression of a relation prior to the transmission of 
ideas. Communication with things is not extraction of in-
formation or data, but of finding oneself invaded and popu-
lated. The saying as communication is exposure. Proximity 
and communication are not modalities of cognition per se as 
communication is irreducible to the process of transmitting 
messages from one ego to another. Moreover, communica-
tion exceeds the data from the signals sent from one ego to 
another. It is something other than the simple transmission 
and reception of signs. Communication is more than its con-
tents. 
At the limit of communication is the gesture towards the 
other. It is at the limit of communication which for Lingis 
gives rise to communication as an ethical event. It is in irrec-
oncilable alterity that we locate a fundamental relationship 






relation, the quintessence of communication. For Levinas in 
Totality and Infinity, first philosophy is an ethics.5 As such, 
the concern for the other is pre-ontological; it is formed nei-
ther through rational calculation nor contract. More funda-
mentally still, it is the very basis of ethically heteronomous 
subjectivity, which is decentred through exposure and open-
ness, through a subjection to the other. Moreover, subjectivi-
ty is constituted through a vulnerability and sensibility, and 
concern for the other is located precisely in this responsibil-
ity.  
One is exposed, presented as vulnerable and sensitive to 
the other who appears as a face. It is through the face that 
the other addresses me silently and makes demands upon me. 
The face is the locus for the beginning of language. Through 
its silence, the face beseeches. And in terms of the proximity 
of the face, there is a suppression of ethical distance.  
Levinas in his discussion of language makes a distinction 
between the sayable and the said.6 Briefly expressed, the said 
is the material of language which imparts information, 
knowledge, and meaning by means of representation. It reg-
isters the correlation between a thing and the thought of that 
thing. The said brings the world into language and language 
into the world by eliding the difference between things and 
words. 
On the other hand, the saying expresses a relation to the 
one being spoken to. It signifies a modality in the approach 
to the other. Language is therefore an expression of relation 
rather than the simple transmission of ideas. Language qua 
the saying is an expression of relation, of drawing close to the 
other, of proposing a proposition to the other. For Levinas, 
the responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to 
anything said. The saying, still entwined in the said, impress-
es before it makes sense; it affects before it effects.  
Contact is therefore the elemental relation, the groundless 






communication theory as he is interested in the ways in 
which language make contact and touches. Heidegger inter-
prets common knowledge as a multiplicity of statements that 
circulate, that are picked up and passed on from one to an-
other. The speakers appear as simple relay points, equivalent 
and interchangeable with one another. Statements are enun-
ciated and repeated because they are of what is said; anyone 
and everyone says them. No one speaks in his own name, no 
one takes responsibility for what is said. In fact, the talk does 
not just circulate in all directions, as interlocutors are not 
merely the relay-points of anonymous refrains. They are or-
dered. There are directions and directives in the talk. For 
Lingis, who sees in language something more fundamental at 
work, Heidegger was bound to misinterpret this as he reduc-
es the function of the talk to that of communicating infor-
mation and hence not the phenomenology of the unsayable.  
 
THINKING AS MATERIAL AND PERFORMATIVE 
 
Philosophy in the Lingisian mode is multi-mediated perfor-
mance as it conveys a wider philosophical message. Lingis’s 
methodology is to ruminate on the limits of the sayable. His 
utterances are made against a backdrop and background of 
images, music, and noise. For the audience there is some 
confusion as to what is being said, what meaning is being 
expressed. While it is debatable that this is always successful, 
Lingis is trying to express or murmur something more fun-
damental. The words that come from the philosopher’s 
mouth are perhaps only part of the tapestry of meaning. The 
disembodied voice is posited as secondary as Lingis’s mode of 
communication bespeaks of different ways of expression and 
languages, of something more elemental. There is Lingis 
dressed as geisha, Lingis speaking against a cacophony of 
Latin American music, Lingis speaking in the dark, with 
only torchlight to read his script. And scattered throughout 
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his books are photographs of faces, faces from different races, 
cultures, across time and places. Faces which disrupt and 
unnerve, which interrupt his text. He is a philosopher who 
dares to live in a world of shadows, where nothing is certain, 
to play with masquerade and camouflage. He is a thinker 
who transports his readers away from the world of light to 
the dark and dingy places of the world, to culturally subter-
ranean pockets of resistance to the banality of things.  
Seemingly contrary to honouring the logos of Western 
metaphysics, he becomes ichthyophagan so as to speak from 
the cave, from the shadows, or the nether world. He becomes 
troglodyte, a cave dweller, in order to know other worlds, to 
speak of the worlds, to nestle in these worlds. Yet, how can 
these subterranean musings be trusted as the thoughts of a 
philosopher? What does it mean for a philosopher to speak 
amid the sumptuous and sensuous arousals and carousals of 
Latin American dance and samba? What is the nature of the 
philosophical voice, the disembodied voice that purports to 
express the truth, devoid of rhetoric and ploy? What does it 
mean for a philosopher to adorn a kimono and play with his 
femininity with coquettish flair and poise? What does it 
mean for him to wander amid the poor and dispossessed 
seeking a humanity stripped of formal rights, responsibilities, 
and legal contracts? Yet, again, perhaps this is still too harsh. 
To speak of the darkness of the cave is perhaps to speak met-
aphorically of the hither side of rationality, above and beyond 
the staid, death-in-life of the solitary-philosopher. It is to 
speak amidst the chaos and darkness, betwixt the cadences, 
shrieks, and coos of the animal kingdom and the baying of 
blood and throbbing of the heart.  
Thitherto, for a philosopher to perform as Lingis does, in 
the material and performative mode would be to risk ridicule. 
He is indeed an experimenter! Yet, perhaps therefore a dif-
ferent kind of philosophy is at work, for this is a philosophy 
which incorporates phenomenological description, anthro-
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pology, psychoanalysis, sociology, as well as anecdote and 
personal observation. He writes both of the non-places of the 
world and of sites of authentic human communication. In the 
non-places of the world, amidst the rumble of the world of 
work and reason, across the transnational, gleaming, techno-
cratic-commercial archipelago of urban technopoles,7 Lingis 
notices the art of ignoring, the seeing without looking. Lingis 
finds in the network of non-places a fundamental non-
communication. Intent on exploring the dark side of globali-
sation, those places and anonymous spaces through which 
one passes without communication, he forges a dualistic phi-
losophy which differentiates the rational, Western, universal, 
Enlightenment societies of advanced planetary capitalism 
with mystical, religious societies, those Othered communities 
of difference. 
SERRES 
One communes to become an other for the other, for the 
interlocutor. Serres’ neo-Socratic theory is a model of the 
polis and police.8 In the ideal metropolis of rational commu-
nity and communication, the paragon is the phantasmagoria 
of harmonious dialogic, the purging of noise. The theory 
maps a milieu in which digitally encoded information and 
data is instantly graspable and where the equivocal voice of 
the outsider is jammed. In the ideal republic, Serres claims 
that communication is indeed possible as the ‘I’ and other are 
trained to code and decode meaning by using the same key.9 
Communication is the said, the dematerialised, rendered 
ethereal.  
In searching for a theory—an ethical theory—outside the 
confines of information science and beyond a model of the 
simple exchange of messages, Lingis critically reads the 
search to expunge the world of noise and the parasite. For 
Lingis, communication is phenomenologically the exposure 
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of oneself to the other. He considers the thither side of the 
sharing and decoding-recoding of the same key to expose the 
underside of the a priori sense of what is held in common. In 
his brilliant work The Community of Those Who Have Nothing 
in Common, Lingis critiques Serres’ idea of noise and the 
view that the parasite of noise is an obstacle to communica-
tion. Lingis makes a fundamental distinction between the 
rational community and the community of those who have 
nothing in common. As he says:  
Anyone who thinks we are only emitting noise is the 
one who does not want to listen. The one who under-
stands is not extracting the abstract form out of the 
tone, the rhythm, and the cadences—the noise inter-
nal to the utterance, the cacophony internal to the 
emission of the message. He or she is also listening to 
that internal noise—the rasping or smouldering breath, the 
hyperventilating or somnolent lungs, the rumblings 
and internal echoes—in which the message is particu-
larized and materialized and in which the empirical 
reality of something indefinitely discernible, encoun-
tered in the path of one’s own life, is referred to and 
communicated.10  
In the latter, all are strangers for each other. However, 
such a community is the one which may appear from time to 
time in the non-places of the world of which Marc Augé 
writes,11 as it is in the language of the latter community when 
breakdown occurs that we evince a language of responsibil-
ity—a veritable ethical and political language—which enables 
the interlocutor to speak in a singular voice. The non-places 
of which Augé writes are populated with dividuated imper-
sons who by their very nature pursue the goals set by the 






according to Lingis, when the facade of the everyday erodes, 
the singular voice speaks, must speak, and must be heard. 
For Lingis, in the ideal republic—the city of communica-
tion maximally purged of noise—universal, unequivocal com-
munication would assume the form a transparent, albeit ma-
chinic, intersubjectivity. He reads Serres as positing the para-
gon of unequivocal communication as crystallised in the case 
of two modems, transmitting and receiving information-bits 
simultaneously. 
The community in which one has nothing in common in-
terrupts the rational community, the world of work and rea-
son. Contra such interference and confusion, interlocutors 
unite against those intent on scrambling communication. 
The one who speaks in his own name, in the first person sin-
gular, denudes himself or herself in the exposure to the other. 
As Lingis explains: “It is to risk what one found or produced 
in common.”12 In the rational community, people speak as 
agents or representatives of the common discourse. They en-
gage in serious speech which conveys the imperative that de-
termines what is to be said.13 The voice is of the rational 
community, but it is not a singular voice. In the community 
of those who have nothing in common I speak for myself as a 
stranger, an outsider, as a newcomer. As Lingis says, I find 
my own voice and words which only I can singularly enunci-
ate. It is in the act of enunciating the singular that I expose 
myself as a unique individual. I am at once exposed, vulnera-
ble, and sensitive to the other. I engage in a language of re-
sponsivity and responsibility. Of singular importance for 
Lingis here is the response and the responsibility we assume. 
Yet, Lingis takes exception to the argument that in some 
sense the authentic sayable of the said is external or outside 
the loop of information exchange, and transgressive of the incessant 
transmitting of messages. Critical of computer technology and 
the military for informing contemporary communication the-






often say to one another makes so little sense. “So little of it 
makes any pretence to be taken seriously, so much of it is 
simple malarkey, in which we indulge ourselves with the 
same warm visceral pleasure that we indulge in belching and 
passing air.”14  
Elsewhere, commenting on the nature of cues, watch-
words, and passwords, Lingis makes the point equally well. 
Writing in Michael Strysick’s The Politics of Community, 
Lingis claims: “So much of that language is non-serious or 
nonsensical. Greetings, hailing or confirming whatever the 
other is doing or saying, and jokes, teasing, and banter—
much of the talk that goes on among us does not aim at truth 
but provokes smiles and laughter. Whoever laughs with us—
or weeps with us—is one of us.”15 
In probing the talk and the idle chatter of das gerede—the 
talk which passes for communication, Lingis interprets the 
will to eliminate noise as a plot to eliminate the other, a xen-
ophobic plot to eviscerate the other. As he says, communica-
tion is an effort to silence not the other, the interlocutor, but 
the outsider: the barbarian.16 
 
BATAILLE AND COMMUNITY 
 
In a similar vein to Deleuze and Guattari, Lingis’s melding 
of phenomenology of the speculations on the nature of the 
singular is not for a contemporary readership, it is for those 
yet to come. He writes for those who seek experiences and 
ecstasy away from the classroom where students identify and 
assimilate information, away from the workplace and factory 
and the regulation of clock time. Thinking takes place 
among the poor and destitute, in places distant from the 
comfortable and suburban lives in developed countries. In 
Dangerous Emotions,17 Lingis says that to lead comfortable 
and suburban lives is to skim over reality. As Lingis says in an 






mountains and remote continents far from our comfortable 
and secure rooms in the urban technopoles, where we meet 
to read to one another what we have thought out on our 
computers.”18 
Embracing elements of Bataille’s solar economy of ex-
penditure without return, communication is perceived as 
functional, transgressive of the rational order of discourse. 
The mode of communication of value for Lingis is that 
which pertains to hæcceity or singularity. In the exclama-
tions, cries, and guffaws of laughter, nothing is reciprocated. 
This is expenditure without return. There is a waste of ener-
gy. Nothing is exchanged. Outside the rational economy of 
equilibrium, Lingis says it is among those who we have noth-
ing in common that we expose ourselves to expenditure, loss, 
and sacrifice. We find this sense of the nothing beyond ex-
change in Contact and Communication, when Lingis says: 
“This beyond is from the first empty; it is the void, nothing-
ness.”19 The desire for communication breaks open the self-
sufficiency of a sovereign being, her autonomy, her integrity, 
and opens her upon something beyond herself. To communi-
cate with another then is to break through integrity, inde-
pendence, autonomy, and nature. It is to intrude, unsettle, 
and wound. Lingis says that community forms a movement 
by which one exposes oneself to the other, to forces and pow-
ers outside oneself, “to death and to the others who die.”20 
What we bear witness to is the inapprehensible, the inassimi-
lable, and the irrecuperable. We can think of Bataille’s theory 
of ‘unemployed negativity’ as a collapsing of the work, of 
l’oeuvre. It is the non-productive. Jean-Luc Nancy derives the 
concept of the inoperable community from Bataille. The in-
operable implies a sense of worklessness and idleness (dé-
soeuvrement). It is a community nonproductive of itself.21 
Lingis takes from Nancy the notion of distress and asks how 
knowledge is gained through the coexistence with the other. 
To understand Lingis’s theory of communication it is im-
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portant to appreciate how distress in the outer zones becomes 
our distress. He inquires into the shared sense of distress 
when we become cognisant of the “exterminations wrought 
upon peoples in and also the culture of technicization and 
simulation that reigns in the richest urban technopoles.”22 If 
the outer zone is the site of the sacred, then Lingis is a phi-
losopher of the outer zone, a philosopher of the sacred. 
Lingis thinks contact with the other as constitutive of a 
fundamental communication that is literally destructive. At 
stake in the risk of communication is a violation and decom-
position of the integrity of the body; a collapse of self-
possession and self-positing subjectivity, a loss of control. In 
fact, a base communication and materialism demands a des-
tratification of identity, or according to Bataille, a sovereignty 
without mastery. Communication implies moments in indi-
viduals when sovereignty is neither autonomy nor domina-
tion over others; it is a state individuals find in themselves. It 
is through contamination and contact with alterity, in a rela-
tion of exposure and abandon, that communication takes 
place. One cannot appropriate the sovereignty of the other 
through communication. On the contrary, it is the giving 
without return, a fusion of subject and object. Identity with 
the other is through non-rational means in the sense of lau-
ghter, tears, or the erotic. Laughter and tears tear apart from 
the world of work and reason. And for Lingis, it is in laugh-
ter, tears and eroticism that we find the conditions of possi-
bility for communication in rational, instrumental thought. 
Lingis finds in blessings and cursings a primary form of 
speech. Lingis writes: “Laughter and tears, blessing and curs-
ing break through the packaging and labeling of things that 
make our environment something only scanned and skim-
med over. They are the forces with which we impact on na-
ture, which we had perused only as the text of the world. 
They are forces that seek out and engage reality.”23 Humans 






modes of language and community—converse over that 
which is amusing or tormenting. 
Contra Kant, Lingis is sceptical of the universal rational 
agent and the law of the categorical imperative which set ex-
amples for everyone. Contrary to the notion that the rational 
agent respects the other via respect for the law that rules and 
binds, Lingis finds in Bataille an alternative model in which 
communication pertains not to the contract but to the con-
tact of an individual with what is and remains beyond him. 
Sovereignty is ridiculous. It is a danger. For Lingis, the 
communication of sexual pleasure comes closest to the es-
sence of majesty. It is through the intermingling of bodies 
that we come to know the other. Lingis finds in Bataille the 
idea that communication pertains to the contact of a sover-
eign being with what is other, a communication with the 
sacred and demonic and a communication with other species, 
inanimate things, and the material universe: an ecology.24 Yet 
the anxiety that composes it is speechless.  
For Lingis, the thirst for communication is for contact 
with beings unlike ourselves. He argues that humans seek 
communication with those different from themselves. And in 
more exotic terms, he writes: “Our most important conversa-
tions are with prostitutes, criminals, gravediggers. We seek to 
be freed from the carapace of ourselves.”25 Beyond the world 
of work and reason, Lingis thinks the outer zone, the world 
of the other, the world of the sacred. Seemingly uninterested 
in the world of abstract, disembodied thought and the pro-
fane sphere of everyday existence, Lingis speaks of the time 
of the sacrificial and the mystical. Here perhaps is the secret 
to understanding Lingis. If the sacred is the zone of the de-
composition of the world of work and reason, and if follow-
ing his reading Bataille, we find the most sacred things in the 
spilling of bodily fluid, then we can take Lingis as saying that 
the deep-seated and ancient sense of communication is the 






with sacred and demonic beings. Then, it would seem that 
Lingis’s theory of communication is a theory of communica-
tion of the sacred. Lingis understands those who perform 
sacrifice as the true identifiers with the victim. It is through 
wounds that communication takes place between humans 
and sacred beings. One is exposed to the others by wounds. 
Moreover, for Lingis following Bataille, communication with 
the sacred and with natural things is in some sense prior to 
communication with other humans. At a more fundamental 
level, communication takes places between human beings 
when we share laughter, grief, and erotic feelings, when dig-
nity is punctured.  
 
To communicate effectively with those who fascinate 
us is to break through their integrity, their natures, their in-
dependence, their autonomy—to wound them.26 
 
For Lingis, sovereign existence is lived in conversations, 
shared laughter, friendship, and eroticism. Indeed, funda-
mental truths are revealed in laughter, friendship, and eroti-
cism. It is in moments of conversation and laughter, in per-
versity in all its myriad forms that we live a sovereign exist-
ence. And it is precisely when we laugh together that humans 
recognise each other as the same kind, as kindred. In similar 
ways, we know one another as human through our tears, and 
through the sexual appetite and attraction. At the limit of 
communication and community is the ‘nothing-in-common’ 
through which communication takes place. This is the mo-




In A Thousand Plateaus,27 Deleuze and Guattari consider slo-
gans or order-words (mots d’ordre) in non-ideological terms. 






and passwords which we attach and avail ourselves to as rep-
resentatives of this or that discipline, body, or group. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, the talk or indirect discourse com-
municates what someone has heard and what someone has 
been told to say. Order-words command the informative 
content of sentences. Deleuze and Guattari perceive obedi-
ence as the honouring of order-words. In speaking to others, 
we transmit to them what we have been told to say.  
In the anti-Chomskyian linguistic thrust of Deleuze and 
Guattari, a positive emphasis is put on fleeing their inherent 
command. While acknowledging the forlornness in seeking 
to escape order-words, Lingis, echoing Deleuze and Guat-
tari, claims the trick is to escape the death sentence and the 
verdict they contain. Such order-words are a “verdict”—a “death 
sentence.”28 Yet Lingis is interested in how the ‘I’ speaks in 
its own name. He says that this will to disclose is not derived 
from a moment of Heideggerian authenticity but is forged 
through a collective, a social machine that compels the ‘I’ to 
speak in its own name. And in doing so blocks other paths of 
creativity and flight, for order-words isolate “an inner core of 
lucidity and will,” and excise a “swarming within of becom-
ings—becoming woman, becoming animal, becoming vege-
table, rhizomatic, becoming mineral, becoming molecular.”29 
For Lingis, to speak in one’s own name is to disconnect from 
a vital environment. To delimit one’s possibilities is a process 




Lingis writes from the perspective of the ‘I,’ from the singu-
lar, from the perspective of saying things simply in one’s own 
name as Nietzsche exhorted his readers to do. He probes the 
‘I’s relation and bond with the l’autrui, the other, and ex-
plores why it is that we understand so little of the other. We 
might say that his linguistic theory is liminally orientated as 
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it contests what can be said or not—it addresses limits of the 
sayable in words and thoughts. He thinks the outside of lan-
guage, the unsayable, the non-rational and unrepresentable 
and transgressive. In a sense, he searches for the compulsions 
to act and speak. As a phenomenological archaeologist of 
desire, he suggests there are communications more profound 
than the babble of the everyday, the talk of the they. He be-
seeches his readers to consider the traumatising question ‘are 
you everyday?’  
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On The Community of Those Who 
Have Nothing in Common1 
by Jeffrey Nealon 
 
 
A note from the author about the following text: This 
is an archival text, delivered at a Penn State Philoso-
phy Department session on Al’s book in 1995, shortly 
after it had been published. Despite my desires to 
change, update, and fudge, I preserve the original dis-
course in accordance with what I learn from Lingis’s 
example—the difficult joy of response, the irreducible 
singularity of the encounter, and the liveliness of me-
mory, among so many other things. 
 
I find myself in a somewhat odd position here this afternoon, 
having been charged with the task of “briefly reviewing the 
main ideas” of Alphonso Lingis’s truly remarkable book, The 
Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. The dif-
ficulty, I guess, is two-fold. First is the problem that one en-
counters before any such rich and engaging text, the uncom-
fortable difficulties of paraphrase: Have I gotten it right? Are 
these really the stakes of the project, or am I just making this 
up? How to impart a sense of the text’s rich complexity, 
while still performing some kind of recognizable summary? 
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And then there’s the second problem—the fact that Al is 
sitting right here, across the table from me, face-to-face. I’m 
thinking he could review the main ideas for us a lot better 
than I could, so what do you need me for, I begin to wonder? 
But I press on, trying to find a path, as we always do in Al’s 
work, for productively engaging the joyously cramped space 
of response. 
One is tempted, in confronting these initial difficulties, to 
introduce the book by situating it within an ongoing scholar-
ly conversation. And Lingis’s book certainly does intervene 
decisively among a series of recent philosophical works that 
take up the question of community from a continental per-
spective—most notably, Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Workless 
Community, Maurice Blanchot’s The Unavowable Communi-
ty, William Corlett’s Community Without Unity, and Derri-
da’s The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe; in turn, 
these books expand on certain themes of alterity and com-
munity articulated by Heidegger, Levinas, Bataille, and oth-
ers. Then, of course, there is also much work on community 
that comes out of Hegelian, Marxist, and postcolonial tradi-
tions—say, Charles Taylor’s work or Habermas’s or Fan-
on’s—and one could perhaps introduce Lingis’s work by situ-
ating it within the debates among communitarianism, Marx-
ism, and postcolonial studies. 
However, as tempting as it is, such scholarly situating will 
never get to the heart and singularity of a work like Lingis’s. 
Even from within the attempt to convene a community of 
works on community, I am inexorably thrown back on the 
difficult question of responding adequately to this work, to 
The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. Its 
specificity calls not for comparison to a community of other 
works, but rather for a radically singular response. 
Of course, maybe this isn’t such a big deal, insofar as this 
type of problem is confronted and eventually overcome all the time, 
in any successful philosophical discussion of a theme within a 





community of like-minded inquirers. Something like this 
difficulty, in fact, is issue one in many scholarly studies of 
community: How does one adequately respond to the rich 
complexity of alterity while still building the rational consen-
sus necessary for mutual discussion and progress? How does 
one begin to form a community out of a bunch of people who 
have nothing in common? As Lingis himself writes on this 
model, “To build community would mean to collaborate in 
industry which organizes the division of labor and to partici-
pate in the market. It would mean to participate in the elabo-
ration of a political structure, laws and command posts. It 
would be to collaborate with others to build up public works 
and communications” (5). These are certainly pressing, diffi-
cult themes, and ones that could potentially occupy us in dis-
cussion for quite some time this afternoon. We could debate, 
for example, whether it really does take a village to raise a 
child. 
However, an other, more essential, difficulty is presented 
to us by The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Com-
mon: from the beginning, this text is not primarily interested 
in philosophical discussions—in the progress of knowledge 
or the parsing deliberation of arguments; it’s not interested in 
founding a rational community based on the properly com-
municated abstraction or the triumphant conclusion. Rather, 
the stakes of The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in 
Common lie irreducibly elsewhere. 
At the same time, Lingis’s text most certainly is con-
cerned with communication and community; it just asks us to 
consider a communication that happens or community that 
forms around situations other than the rational exchange of 
information within a community of like-minded individuals. 
As he writes, “Beneath the rational community . . . is another 
community, the community that demands that the one who 
has his own communal identity, who produces his own na-






common, the stranger. The other community is not simply 
absorbed into the rational community; it recurs, it troubles 
the rational community, as its double or its shadow” (10). 
It is, then, toward this other community—the community 
before, beneath, or beyond the rational community of pro-
gress and consensus—that Lingis relentlessly draws our at-
tention. In a sentence that might be said to mark the book’s 
most insistently recurring gesture, Lingis writes that “Before 
the rational community, there was the encounter with the 
other” (10). And, for Lingis, this kind of encounter with the 
other is one that necessarily takes place both inside and outside 
the dominant laws and norms of any given political culture; 
such an encounter demands that we respond to the other, 
without any concrete sense of how we might adequately ren-
der such a response. As he puts it, “To respond to the other, 
even to answer her greeting, is already to recognize her rights 
over me. Each time I meet his glance or answer her words, I 
recognize that the imperative that orders his or her approach 
commands me also. I cannot return her glance, extend my 
hand, or respond to his words without exposing myself to his 
or her judgment and contestation” (33). 
As Lingis shows throughout his text, much “philosophi-
cal” discussion of community unfortunately boils down to a 
series of questions concerning how one can overcome differ-
ence—how a community can put its differences aside and 
work together toward common goals, in the project of form-
ing what Hegel famously calls the “I that is We and We that 
is I.” For Lingis, however, the I or the subject is related less 
to a common “We” [W-E] than it is a singular oui [O-U-I], 
to an imperative saying-yes to alterity. This yes, this other 
oui, cannot merely be understood as a rational or normative 
rule of the community’s law; as he writes, “It is not only with 
one’s rational intelligence that one exposes oneself to an im-
perative” (11); rather, as Lingis shows us through the many 
interventions and encounters in his text, the imperative to 





respond to the other shows itself and becomes compelling 
precisely at the limits of the rational community—at those 
places or in those moments where the content of what we say 
is less important than the raw, phatic fact of speaking, being-
there, accompanying the other, responding to the other’s 
approach, answering the other’s call. 
Lingis thematizes this distinction between two kinds of 
communications, two communities, as follows: “There are 
then two entries into communication—the one which deper-
sonalizes one’s visions and insights, formulates them in the 
terms of the common rational discourse, and speaks as a rep-
resentative, a spokesperson—equivalent and interchangeable 
with others—for what has to be said. The other entry into 
communication is that in which you find it is you, you saying 
something, that is essential” (116). This speaking other-wise is 
the radically singular saying that comes before the general or 
translatable said of rational communication; such saying is, 
then, literally the origin of community and dialogue, but it is 
itself not a generalizable or translatable component of ration-
alist discussion. The simple fact of my speaking in response 
to the approach of an other is already a testament to the oth-
er’s primacy and irreducibility; but, as Lingis insists, “it is also 
a beginning, the beginning of communication” (114). 
Throughout The Community of Those Who Have Nothing 
in Common, Lingis consistently calls our attention to these 
other entries into “communication” (or these entries into an 
other communication) at the margins of a community: en-
countering a stranger in a foreign land, our call to the bedside 
of a dying loved one, the caress in desire, our stammering 
confrontations with language. Such radically singular events 
mark “A situation in which the saying, essential and impera-
tive, separates from the said, which somehow it no longer 
orders and hardly requires” (109). And it is, Lingis shows, 
precisely at these limits of communication—at those mo-






al and out of our control—that communication itself is born. 
As he writes, it is “the surfaces of the other, the surfaces of 
suffering, that face me and appeal to me and make demands 
on me. In them, an alien imperative weighs on me. The 
weight of the imperative is felt in the surfaces with which the 
other faces me with his weariness and vulnerability and 
which afflict me and confound my intentions” (32). Com-
munication begins or happens, in other words, not when I 
confidently transfer my abstract meaning or ideas to the oth-
er, but rather in those moments when my self-assured pro-
jects falter, where my spontaneity is called radically into 
question by the sheer presence of the other. Such limit-
experiences comprise an irrecoverable movement outside the 
self, a gesture that “has no idea of what to do or how to es-
cape. Its movement is nowise a project; one goes where one 
cannot go, where nothing is offered and nothing is promised” 
(178). Such a gesture of response, in other words, moves in-
exorably toward the exterior, toward the other. 
There certainly is, then, a surviving notion of community 
in Lingis’s text—a quite literal community of those who have 
nothing in common—but such a community is formed not by 
a closing in, by the issuing of ID cards or by the creation of a 
common interior space, safe from irrational intrusion; rather, 
Lingis holds that “Community forms in a movement by 
which one exposes oneself to the other, to forces and powers 
outside oneself, to death and to the others who die” (12). 
In the end, it seems to me that Lingis’s interventions into 
the discourses of community are essentially ethical interven-
tions; both the philosophical stakes and—just as important-
ly—the metonymic or empirical operations of the surface of 
his text comprise powerfully compelling ethical movements. 
However, the ethical component of this text is not to be 
found in abstract systems of reciprocal obligation; rather, 
ethics in The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Com-
mon is born and maintained through the continuing necessity 





of response—to other people, to animals, to the earth itself. 
And such a responsiveness or responsibility comes always 
before and beyond the solidification of any theoretical rules or 
political norms of ethical conduct. This is why, throughout 
the text, Lingis consistently calls us to consider the primacy 
of what we might call “non-philosophical” experience—that 
is, he continually calls attention to the primacy of an experi-
ence of sociality or otherness that comes before any philo-
sophical understanding or reification of our respective subject 
positions. 
In this insistence, perhpas we see Lingis’s debt to Lev-
inas’s (non)concept of the “face-to-face” encounter with the 
other. As Levinas writes, in Lingis’s translation, the face-to-
face “situation is an experience in the strongest sense of the 
term: a contact with a reality that does not fit into any a pri-
ori idea, which overflows all of them. . . . A face is pure expe-
rience, conceptless experience.”2 
In Lingis’s work, like Levinas’s, such an “experience” ex-
ceeds all my categories of knowledge or understanding. This 
relation between self and other cannot simply be translated 
into rational, conceptual thought, because to do so would be 
to destroy the unmotivated, spontaneous character of en-
counter. But, at the same time, there is an obligation to re-
spond built into the very situation of the face-to-face en-
counter, insofar as the experience of the other person is also a 
concrete, social phenomenon. As Lingis writes, “The face of 
the other is the original locus of expression” (63), and we 
must respond to this social fact of otherness just as we must 
respond to the experiential fact that fire burns flesh or food 
nourishes it; such response does not simply—or even pri-
marily—find its origin in the subject’s “choice.” 
Ethics is born(e), then, not in the time of the communi-
ty’s progress—in the reciprocity of offers or promises made to 
the others—but rather in the time of the other, which Lingis 






ised” (178). All of my possibilities and enjoyments are, from 
the beginning and in the end, owed to the other. As Lingis 
writes near the end of his text, “For me, the world is, from 
the start, a field of possibilities others have apprehended and 
comprehended, possibilities for others. What I find as possi-
bilities for me are possibilities others have left me” (177). 
And, in, or at the end, it is just such a gift—a toolbox of 
possibilities for becoming-other—that Alphonso Lingis leav-
es for us, in the pages of his extraordinary Community of Those 
Who Have Nothing in Common. 
 
Thank you, Al. Really. 
 
                                                                                                   
 
1 Alphonso Lingis, The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in 
Common (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); hereafter 
referred to parenthetically by page number. 
2 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” 
in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 




What Is an Imperative? 





Each morning we wake up to an ongoing miracle. Light is 
there for us and it forms a level. Along this level I see the 
color-contrasts of the Western mountain range’s phospho-
resce. Sounds awaken too. They awaken out of the level that 
is the murmur of nature from which the cry of hawks, the 
whining of coyotes fill the air. And close by, the harsh col-
ored billboards stick up in the level of the light as the the cars 
and trucks roll by, hurried and noisy, emerging from the level 
that is sound, the sound of the strong winds blowing up a 
storm heading east to the plains where they meet the Gulf 
moisture, twisting it into tornadoes. These levels, as Alphon-
so Lingis calls them, “form in a medium without dimensions 
or directions: the luminosity more vast than any panorama 
that the light outlines in it, the vibrancy that prolongs itself 
outside the city and beyond the murmur of nature, the dark-
ness more abysmal than the night from which the day dawns 
and into which it entrusts itself.”1 
This medium is the world, but how are we to characterize 






els? And do we understand in what manner levels give rise, 
not only to competent bodies able to negotiate the practicali-
ties of life, bodies for which seeing and seeing the true are 
one and the same, but also to all the rest, “the monocular 
phantasms, mirages, and depths of floating color and shad-
ow, tonalities and scents, erotic obsessions, nocturnal phan-
tasms, mythogenic and magical realms.”2 To the extent that 
we do not yet understand these things, we will begin by pos-
iting a world that is neither coherent nor incoherent, neither 
real nor imaginary.3 Instead, in an epoché, a suspension of 
understanding and reason, even further removed from the 
subject than that of Henri Bergson, who asks us to begin our 
reflections on the world with nothing more than images, let 
us begin, following Lingis, with the sensible intuition of a 
world set in depths and uncharted abysses.4 
In the world of depths and abysses, Lingis tells us, sensi-
bility can be drawn in and drawn in imperatively to the vorti-
ces that populate these depths. In physics, vortices have been 
described variously as “‘the sinews of turbulence,’ [and] ‘the 
voice of fluid motion.’”5 Unlike solids, which do not manifest 
vortices, ‘“the essence of fluid is vortices,’” especially insofar as 
fluids at rest cannot stand shear stress, the tendency of a fluid 
to be “pulled apart” (sheared) by a differential force.6 Shear 
stress puts fluid elements into spinning motion, causing rota-
tional or vortical flow.7 Fluid motion produces vortices via 
the rotation of fluid elements. Vortices are manifest in spiral 
galaxies, hurricanes, tornadoes, and in the vortex rings of the 
mushroom cloud of a nuclear explosion.8 Let us not assume 
however that the presence of a vortex signals the lack of a 
coherent structure. The study of vortices is central to under-
standing the functioning of aerodynamics, as well as to the 
understanding of the formation and evolution of large-scale 
vortices in the ocean and atmosphere, both of which play a 
crucial role in geophysical fluid dynamics.9 
Such vortices, Lingis posits, are precisely what occur in 





the depths of the world. Although they first form us, we find 
them only where the body lets loose its hold on the levels 
that provide perceptual consistency and coherence revealing 
“apparitions made of light, voices of the abyss, enigmas made 
of darkness.”10 Where Immanuel Kant posited a universe of 
three faculties: intuition, understanding, and reason, in which rea-
son determines and makes intelligible the other two, and to-
gether, the three produce God, the World, and the Self, 
Lingis seems to turn the Kantian thesis on its head.11 The 
universe—the world preexists our faculties and is the medi-
um in which our sensibility first finds itself—first takes shape 
in the vortices of the world which is the medium that shapes 
our sensitivities and sensibilities and eventually shapes our 
understanding and our reason. 
In the vortices of the medium, we are not in the realm of 
what can be done but in the realm of appearances where no 
thing, no object according to a concept, appears. It is the 
realm of phantoms, caricatures, doubles floating over the 
contours of things, and planes in the world.12 And, of the 
utmost importance, it is the realm where the imperative first 
makes itself known to us as to all the phenomena of this 
world. The visionary eye obeys the imperative to shine, to 
light beyond every and any specified direction. Vertigo obeys 
the imperative to deepen endlessly. Hearing obeys the imper-
ative to become vibrant beyond every and any situation. And 
eventually, all phenomena obey the imperative to let go of 
the world forever, to become elemental, returning to the vor-
tices out of which all things and beings emerge.13 
No longer maintaining ourselves, letting loose our hold 
on things, un-holding the levels that give us a grip on the 
world transports “us” or what is left of “us” to an infantile and 
phantasmal existence wherein other bodies materialize as for-
ces and powers that belong to enigmatic imperatives without 
which our world is nothing but tasks, objectives, competence, 






we have on the world and things, or is it that the world and 
things have a grip on us? To understand this, let us examine 




When we pass from light as immersion in radiance to light as 
it penetrates space, outlines contours, rests on surfaces, the 
light has become a level. We see according to the level that is 
the light leading us to things, just as we hear a piece of music 
according to the dominant chord when the band or orchestra 
begins to play.15 Likewise, smell or taste function only in a 
medium of odors or tastes, just as everything touchable forms 
a level of pattern, grain, smoothness, hardness, softness—all 
of this taking place in a temporal level that directs our move-
ments, visibility, resonance, looking, listening, touching.16 
Thus, levels—according to which we perceive—are purely 
sensory phenomena and for this reason impossible to measure 
and difficult even to conceptualize. 
All the particulars of our sensory organs take place on the 
levels. Sounds, colors, tastes, contacts are not properties of 
things nor ideas of agents but characteristics acquired in rela-
tion to a level. As such they are “salients, contours, contrasts, 
inceptions and terminations,” and as sensible characteristics, 
they play diacritically in the levels where they appear.17 Thus 
the red flower invades the light and contrasts with it, it greens 
the leaves on the stem and whitens the sheets of the hospital 
room where it appears.18 Unlike the Kantian object, which 
appears in the mathematical grid of the a priori space-time 
manifold, determined by a concept, and delimited by reason’s 
rational order, “the sensory flux does not present itself as so 
many space-time points successively filled and emptied and 
filled again, but as a sphere in which points pivot, edges ex-
tend levels, spaces open paths, colors intensify themselves by 
playing across a field, tones thicken and approach and thin 





out and recede and send their overtones into one another.”19 
When this happens, when there is no a priori space-time 
manifold, then it seems that the contours of a figure do not 
take shape, a visible goes unseen, a sound unheard, a sub-
stance is not felt. Yet that is precisely when the sensorial me-
dium called a level persists and asserts itself as a directive that 
weighs on us. It is a directive to us to mobilize! Our look is led 
by the directive, but we must focus and move our eyes. The 
music takes shape for us only when we start to dance; and to 
feel soft or hard surfaces, we must move our fingers and 
hands and adjust our bodies so as to hold our arms in the 
right position. Sensations take form in the vortices, but we 
must conduct our moves in accordance with their characteris-
tics.20 The visible, audible, and tangible unfold in the field 
even in mirages, in pianissimo, grazing our skin, for our bod-
ies are such that they can “catch on” to even the slightest sen-
sations and transmit motions to the entire body. So we sing 
as we swing our arms and turn our heads in the direction and 
rhythm of the music. In our bodies, nothing is isolated, eve-
rything is transmitted from one muscle to another as we fol-
low the directives, the imperatives coming to us from the lev-
els. 
It is these directives, these imperatives, that are also the 
basis of our coexistence, our community with others. Long 
before we engage with the understanding and the reasoning 
faculty of others, we come upon one another in the levels of 
sensibility, the elements that direct us as we sense sentient 
bodies seeing and touching in the levels, accompanying us, 
our sensibilities displaced into those others, and theirs also 
onto ours, variants of one another.21 Their ears hear what we 
hear so that when we have left the room, the forest, the 
oceanside, and they stay, the levels, the sensory elements, the 
reliefs and contours, the sonorities and tangibilities that di-
rect them and us remain operative, so sight, hearing, touch, 







Given the elemental nature of levels that provide direc-
tives, it makes sense that things call to our bodies so pro-
foundly. “A perceived this is a pole which draws the conver-
gent surfaces and organs of our bodies like a telos, a task. 
The reality of things is not given in our perception, but orders 
it as in imperative.”22 It is not we who judge the intelligibility 
of things but things that “try out their reality in indecisive 
and inconclusive appearances.”23 Recent studies in the physi-
ology of perception indicate that when sensory messages are 
available, chaotic, collective activity involving millions of 
neurons is essential to rapid recognition. What is relevant 
here is that when cortical neurons are excited, their output 
increases until they reach a maximal rate. If, for example, an 
odorant is active such that the neuronal collectives are gener-
ally aroused, the information spreads “like a flash fire thro-
ugh the nerve cell assembly. . . . so that the input rapidly ig-
nites an explosion of collective activity throughout the entire 
assembly,” spreading until it ignites a “full blown burst.”24 
Such nearly instantaneous activity allows for novel activity 
patterns and implies that the brain seeks information. 
Adapted to Lingis’s model, we may say that the impera-
tive to seek information comes not only from the “brain,” but 
initially from the levels, from the environment of things. 
Things are not dead matter. They push back and push aside 
other things and “clamor for our attention” as our senses sink 
into the depths of things, not content to remain on the sur-
face.25 This is why Lingis states that on the levels of sensuali-
ty, the levels along which we move, our enjoyment is not dis-
tinctly our own, but the night, the light, the air, the earth are 
all depersonalizing. Everything open to us is first open to oth-
ers, open to anyone in their range with the ability to perceive 
or use them.26 
Thus, language is not first. Language, the symbolic realm, 
is not the first medium of communication.27 The ability to 





use concepts, to reason about space or time, the ability to 
universalize our acts such that any one, at any time, in 
equivalent circumstances would act in the same way, none of 
these are the basis of our communication with and affinity 
for others. Rather, wherever we go, whatever we perceive, 
someone else has been there first and their inhabitation of 
that level and its perceptibles will inevitably have entered that 
level and will inform our engagement with that level and 




For Kant, the whole point of moral law is to free us from 
nature’s causal forces. Newtonian science, with its laws of 
motion governing the motions of physical bodies, seemed to 
have made this a difficult goal. The possibility of what Kant 
calls “free will” is radically undermined. So we must think our 
way out of this. We know that we are causal phenomena in 
nature, but nevertheless, we think that we are free, that our 
actions are intelligent, that we do not follow blind impulse.28 
How is this done? Autonomy, freedom from nature’s me-
chanical causality, which is to say, from our own bodily 
pleasures and pains, is taken to be an imperative. Although 
nature is mechanical, each subject feels its effects differently. 
Some like the feeling of beaches and ocean, others prefer 
cold mountain tops, but no one can remove themselves from 
some feeling, thus there is always a subjective incentive to 
choose one or another object. 
If freedom means that there is an unconditioned first 
cause of our actions, then subjective preferences will not yield 
this; they remain subject to nature’s causal forces. Yet, we do 
feel something that informs us that we are free. We feel the 
check on our self-love.29 This feeling alerts us to the exist-
ence of freedom because we ask ourselves, what is it that is 






of subjective desire and find only self-love there; so then we 
abstract from all empirical conditions, all particular objects 
and goals that are motivated by self-love. What we are left 
with is the form of giving the universal rule, freedom in the 
strictest, transcendental sense, the form of all possible imper-
atives to act. We harmonize this transcendental law with our 
subjective desires by checking inclinations, and we feel the 
pain of rejecting every sensible condition, every “I desire,” 
leaving us, in the end, with the negative feeling which is re-
spect for moral law, respect for our ability to cease to be sub-
ject to nature’s mechanical causal forces. We abstract from 
our subjective inclinations leaving only objective rules for the 
will. 
But subjective humiliation yields objective respect, the so-
called a priori or intellectual feeling of respect for moral law, 
because it blocks subjective feeling, a block caused by our in-
tellectual recognition of freedom from nature’s causal mecha-
nism.30 The blockage, the pain, the humiliation, is the sub-
jective, sensible incentive to never act on sensible, subjective 
motives and, therefore, to act only on the basis of freedom. 
This is what is called, by Kant, moral law. For the sake of 
freedom, all inclinations are limited, choked off. Our recog-
nition of freedom constrains us, makes it a duty, a rule char-
acterized by an “ought,” that we ought not to act on subjec-
tive motives and that this law must completely determine the 
will, and not just mine, but everyone’s, anyone who thinks.31 
When freedom alone determines the will, its laws are cate-
gorical imperatives; they are thus necessary, unconditional, 
free of inclinations, and thereby universal.32 
It seems that Lingis agrees with Kant that an imperative 
is a practical necessity arising with and out of respect.33 But 
as Lingis notes, for Kant, “the immediate effect of the ration-
al activity of the will is the reduction of sensuous impulses 
and appetites to impotence.”34 Negatively, this is something 
like fear; positively, it is something like inclination, that is, 





respect for law. Kant’s imperative, Lingis continues, consti-
tutes a typology according to which the person is constrained 
in three ways. First, we are constrained to represent the sen-
sible world as surface effects of bodily physiology and physio-
chemical natural forces. Second, we are constrained to view 
our sensory and motor powers as solely in the service of the 
the rational, practical faculty. And third, we are constrained 
to imagine ourselves as wholly obedient to the commands of 
reason.35 And of course, the commands of reason, the law, is 
a set of properties drawn from logic, the logic that was vali-
dated by Newtonian physics.36 But as Lingis points out, in 
the current era, mathematics and the logics utilized in math-
ematics make use of a vast array of idealized conceptual mod-
els. Mathematics is not unified but divided into a plethora of 
mathematical disciplines.37 Thus, what is needed now is not 
representations of our nature, of our faculties as instrumental 
systems and ourselves as microsocieties, but something else, 
some other imperative that accounts for our sensuality, sensi-
tivity, perception, thought, and motility.38 
 
THE IMPERATIVE OF THE OTHER 
 
Why something else, why another sort of imperative? Per-
haps the urgency of this other imperative emerges for Lingis 
in the analysis of the other, which he formulates in terms 
borrowed from Emmanuel Levinas. Hands that touch others 
“do not move with their own goals in view; they are moved, 
troubled by the touch of the other with which they make 
contact, afflicted with the pleasure and the torment of the 
other.”39 The imperative is formulated in this manner be-
cause the hands now “make contact with a vulnerability that 
summons them, a susceptibility that puts demands on them.”40 
So, it is the case here that the ethical imperative is not sub-
jectively motivated, but neither is it a rational imperative to 






depth where vortices form levels according to which phe-
nomena are perceived. “We greet the other as a depth struc-
ture of forces, and recognize community with him or her, in 
the handshake that seals the pact.”41 
Nevertheless, the sounds of wind or traffic or the sight of 
forests or cities is not the same as the encounter with others 
who speak and act, who look into our own eyes with their 
eyes, whose words call up or respond to one’s own speaking 
and hearing. Without the other who speaks to me, gestures 
at me, looks into my eyes and acts in the world, without this 
other, I have no world. The imperative of the other, the de-
mands of the other that are put on me, the appeals made to 
me are all necessities for me, indications that the world they 
inhabit is also the the world open to me. “For it is before the 
face of the other that I first entered speech.”42 And even if I 
interpret or identify the other, represent the other, that oth-
er—all those specific and unique others moving through the 
world, perceiving that way they perceive, inhabiting levels in 
the manner that they do this—contests my manner of per-
ceiving and inhabiting, my manner of moving and seeing, my 
speech and actions. Not an other me but a persistence that 
challenges my speech and actions, my perceptions and move-
ments. The gaze, the skin, the anxiety, the laughter, the ar-
rogance, the suffering, the age, the voice, the gait, the vulner-
ability, all belong to the other, all contest me with their very 
existence. This is now the sense of the imperative. It “weighs 
on us with the force of exteriority,” such that we cannot but 
look, touch, caress or torment, except as an answer to the 
demand, the imperative to attend to the other.43 
Yet, the question remains as to whether or not this is 
enough, whether it is adequate or not. That is, is the impera-
tive addressed to us in the face of the other adequate to pro-
mulgate respect—or is it not just as easy for us physically or 
economically, psychologically or politically to not respect the 
imperative that comes from the other? Will this keep us from 





harming and destroying the other, taking away their land, 
their children, their futures, and their pasts? And if not, then 
given the disintegration of the universal, rational moral law, 
then what now, what next? 
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INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 
JS: You graduated from the Jesuit Loyola University in Chi-
cago, you defended a dissertation at the University of Leu-
ven, where the Husserl Archives were founded. During your 
time in Europe you seem to have attended lectures by Jean-
Paul Sartre, Jacques Lacan and maybe other Parisian figures. 
What was to you most important during these formative 
years? 
AL: Leuven was where I really learnt philosophy. When I 
was an undergraduate, I did not have a good education. At 
Leuven it was a historical program, so we had to study each 
period. But it had an emphasis on contemporary philosophy. 
And students were mostly interested in contemporary philos-
ophy. And I was also. I wrote my dissertation on Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty. For me that was the beginning. When I 







JS: And how about your undergraduate studies at Loyola? 
 
AL: I forgot everything from there. That was not very good.  
 
JS: It seems that you visited Paris for philosophy during your 
studies in Europe. 
 
AL: After the studies at Leuven a few times I spent some 
summer time in Paris. And I heard there some lectures by 
Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty one time, Sartre two times. 
 
JS: What was the impression of encountering these figures?  
 
AL: Well, I had no real personal encounter. But I think it’s 
true that all the great philosophers, that I had some idea 
what kind of men they are, I admired them. In my first year 
in America, when I came back to teach, Paul Ricoeur came 
and spoke at my university. And he stayed three or four days. 
I spent time with him. And I admired him very much; he 
was a marvellous man. And, you know, I heard stories about 
Sartre. And every story was pretty admirable. Sartre was very 
generous. He would easily give money to students and so on. 
I have an admiration for the big thinkers. 
 
JS: Were you influenced in any way by the events of May 
‘68? 
 
AL: Definitely. In the United States. And I was in Paris in 
that summer, although it was already going down. To me it 
was a very intoxicating time.  
 
JS: Did you have any clear vision of the philosophy you 
wanted to engage in after your bachelor or even doctoral 
studies? How did you discover Merleau-Ponty and Levinas?  
 





AL: For a long time I concentrated on educating. I devoted 
myself to teaching, and every class I tried to teach different 
new books and so on. For a long time I thought I had no 
ideas of my own. And then, after a while, I began to realize 
that sometimes you can have, you know, small ideas. And I 
began to write an article after finishing a course, putting to-
gether a few small ideas. I thought I had no big system. And 
then, I think, I was influenced by Henri Birault from Paris, 
who came to Penn State while I was teaching. He would take 
these little sections from Nietzsche and just spend two or 
three hours talking about this one section. And he did not 
want students to talk about other sections or connections 
with other sections. And then the other influence I had was 
from British philosophy: Wittgenstein, Austin, and Bernard 
Williams—I liked them very much. Then I got the idea after 
a while that that was the kind of philosophy I really liked—
that you take some concrete issue and try to see it in a new 
way. And for a long time that was what I did. I think that’s 
what I still do. And then sometimes, after you had two or 
three of these things, you can see that they are connected and 
make a bigger idea out of that. That to me is the most valua-
ble philosophy. The most valuable philosophy is not the phi-
losophy that is some big principles and abstract generaliza-
tions, but when you study some concrete thing and see it in a 
new way or see it more deeply. I think that is what Foucault 
did and also Merleau-Ponty.  
 
JS: But don’t you get lost in empirical details having no ab-
stract orientation? Is not there a danger of naïve empiricism? 
 
AL: Right, you are certainly right. Well, we have in philoso-
phies, like in phenomenology, we do have some general con-
cepts. I guess the ideas about method and general concepts 
that I learned from phenomenologists, little by little I criti-






nomenology you have the position that here is consciousness 
and here is everything else. And this is the fundamental divi-
sion. And when you think about it, that’s a very strange view 
of the universe. All the sciences are completely different. In 
biology and evolution the human mind is immersed in na-
ture. So more and more I criticized this phenomenological 
division. And the other side of it is that phenomenology just 
starts with my own consciousness and what I can myself be 
aware of in my own mind. But you know, then I studied 
Whitehead. I think the thought I got was that consciousness 
depends on all kinds of other things in the body. There is a 
kind of response in the nervous system, in the cells, in the 
blood stream, and so on. And some consciousness is just the 
top of many levels. I would like to see philosophy approach 
more in that way.  
Going back to your question concerning how I discovered 
the philosophy of Levinas. The first year I came back from 
graduate school and started to teach in the United States, 
Ricoeur visited. And I asked him what is new in philosophy. 
And he said, the most important thing was the book of 
Levinas. So immediately I bought it. And then a publisher 
invited me to translate it. That’s how I discovered him. I was 
very enthusiastic.  
 
JS: And how did the philosophy of Nietzsche become im-
portant to you? 
 
AL: I have liked Nietzsche from the beginning, but he was 
not an important philosopher for me until later. So, this tra-
dition of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Deleuze—that was a kind 
of continuation there. And that became very important to 
me. I became very, very interested in Bataille, maybe about 
fifteen or twenty years ago. I read some Bataille when I was a 
graduate student, but later I read the complete works and I 
was very enthusiastic and talked about it in a class. So it be-





came very important. For me, these three thinkers are inter-
connected—Nietzsche, Bataille, and Deleuze. I suppose that 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger and 
then these other three were for me the richest, the ones who 




JS: I would like to ask about your conception of nature. It 
seems that nature is one of the most important themes in 
your philosophy (although most often you address it indirect-
ly). It seems that you conceive the universe, nature, life itself 
in purely positive terms—as fullness, as abundance that lacks 
nothing. It seems that the ontology which makes negativity 
important or even fundamental is unacceptable to you. Am I 
right? 
 
AL: On the last concept, that of negativity, I suppose I was 
influenced by Deleuze and then later by some thoughts from 
Bataille. But this is not only a specific theoretical point, but 
it’s sort of my practice that I began to realize.  
We could take this idea that’s Nietzschean and Deleuzi-
an. That throughout the history of philosophy one could say 
that life was conceived negatively. Naturally, it reaches its 
strongest development in Hegel. This is the idea that a living 
thing is a material system that develops lacks—there’s evapo-
ration, the system becomes hungry and thirsty. And it’s these 
lacks that agitate the system. The reason that an organism 
moves and is released to the environment is that it is driven 
by needs and lacks. I think that the concept of an organism 
has pretty much dominated from the beginning. I suppose an 
alternative idea I found originally in Bataille, but it seems to 
me it is everywhere in science: that, on the contrary, a living 
organism is a dynamo that produces energy. It produces more 






think that most of our lacks are produced because we spend 
so much energy releasing excess energy. And most of us get 
hungry because we’ve gone walking in the mountains all day. 
And we did that because we had excess energy, we had ener-
gy to burn, to discharge. I think that the lacks are intermit-
tent and superficial. The only reason that there is hunger is 
that there is a full organism that exists, and that the need is 
intermittent; it depends on the fullness of the organism.  
And then I began to realize that, when I try to talk about 
things, I always try to find some very strong and very clear 
example. For example, when I talk about honour, people 
want me to talk about dishonour and disgrace. I always in-
stinctively felt that you first have to understand honour. And 
it is only if we could get very clear about what honour is that 
we can begin to speak about dishonourable activities and so 
on. So I think in my practice I always tried to look at positive 
cases. And very often, when I finished talking about it, I was 
not interested in negative cases. It happens from time to time 
that people want to know about dishonour and, I guess, I 
never thought about it because I was not very interested in it. 
It was so interesting to talk about the sense of honour. De-
leuze somewhere wrote that Nietzsche wanted to have totally 
positive and affirmative philosophy.  
 
JS: You write in The Community of Those Who Have Nothing 
in Common that there is also an alienation from the elements. 
How does this happen? 
 
AL: I don’t think I have very many general ideas about it. 
There are probably a multitude of different ways and reasons 
for that. Last night there was a sort of thought in the air. 
Say, on the one hand, sometimes I get such a sense that the 
human race is so bellicose, so warlike. I mentioned that in 
Spain every little town had a wall around it. It was amazing. 
Especially now, you know, when we’re accustomed to driving 





in the United States from one end to the other without barri-
ers, without custodies. But on the other hand, I am much 
more impressed by the fact that people do get along with one 
another, and people really take pleasure in just being togeth-
er. So the affirmative fact seems much more fundamental. I 
said this a little bit last night, too. It seems to me that a war 
is a kind of artificial construction. First, you have to have the 
whole bureaucracy and industry and then you have to have 
certain leaders who can create war. Wars don’t happen just 
because people feel antagonistic to one another. Even if you 
have two different ethnic groups—say French and Ger-
mans—even if they hate one another, there is no war, unless 
you have this machine that’s constructed to build the weap-
ons and the factories, and the army. That seems to me kind 
of an artificial thing. Even to build an army—there’s some-
thing sort of puzzling to me.  
I remember, years ago I went to a museum, I think it was 
in Czechoslovakia. And I discovered that somewhere two 
thousand years ago, there was a great Moravian empire that 
had conquered a large area there. They waged wars, they ex-
panded their territory, and then history covered them over 
and they were pretty much forgotten, until it was rediscov-
ered recently that they even existed. And I remember stand-
ing in this museum and thinking to myself that these thou-
sands of Moravians decided to go and kill people and a lot of 
them were killed. For what? For the Moravian Empire? It 
always seems to me such an artificial thing. 
You know, at the beginning of my career there was the 
Vietnam War. And that occupied everybody and that occu-
pied me very much. I tried to argue against this war in any 
possible way. And that’s all we talked about for ten years. 
Fifty thousand American soldiers were killed. And some-
thing like two or three million Vietnamese people were 
killed. And I went to Vietnam, maybe about ten years after 






U.S. government forbade me to go there. And so I went with 
a little group from Australia. And when I went there, I real-
ised that nobody talked about Vietnam anymore. For ten 
years this was the most important issue in the United States. 
And we lost, and fifty thousand American soldiers died. And 
then, ten years later it’s like it does not matter, Vietnam isn’t 
that important. Finally, the United States says okay, you just 
do whatever you want to do and it does not matter to us. 
And then later there was a war again in Nicaragua. That was 
the big issue. And in the last ten years you never see in the 
paper anything about Nicaragua. So it is unimportant. Just in 
those two examples these wars depend on somebody con-
structing a very artificial machine. First of all, someone de-
cides that this is strategically important for the United States. 
And then, secondly, someone constructs this whole ideology 
that they are terrible enemies. This was what happened in 
Iraq—the idea that Saddam Hussein was like Hitler and that 
he had to be destroyed. There was a whole artificial construc-
tion.  
 
JS: Let us return to your phenomenology of nature, that you 
exposed most systematically in your book The Imperative. 
 
AL: I was very impressed with Levinas. So there were two 
sides. On the one side, there was this phenomenological 
analysis of what it means to be faced by someone and the 
dimension of appeal and demand that is there. The theme of 
the face is original and a completely new contribution to phi-
losophy. But I think the other side is what he says about the 
elements and substances and so on. And it was also com-
pletely interesting. I just recently have gone back to these 
issues.  
But I think that more and more as years passed I became 
more and more critical about the theoretical framework of 
Levinas. On the one hand, he does a kind of constitutive 





phenomenology that says things are in some way constituted 
by manipulation and detaching them and taking them into 
the home and all that. This is what makes them into curious 
things. So that is a kind of leftover of Husserl, this idea of 
constitution of objects. So nature is quite absent in his phi-
losophy. And then, he wants to find ethical experience only 
in the face of his confrontation with another human being. 
Anyhow, all this seems to me so limited. If it’s true that I feel 
that hunger and need of another human being is a demand 
put on me, then it is also about other species. If I come upon 
an injured bird or deer in a path, it is exactly the same thing, 
it seems to me.  
And then this theme of religion in there, of God in 
there—I had real theoretical problems with it. The simplest 
way I can say it is that for Levinas what is distinctive about 
the human being that looks at me is that the needs and de-
mands are unending. He says that the more responsible you 
are, the more responsibilities you discover. There is a sort of 
infinite, unending succession of demands that are made on 
me by anyone who faces me. On the one hand, it’s simply 
false. I mean, take a simple example. It’s true that I have a 
responsibility for my child to take care of his needs that he 
cannot take care of himself. But the child wants to be inde-
pendent. I mean, all the others in the universe are not de-
pendent on me. They don’t want to be. My child doesn’t 
want me to be taking care of his needs all his life. And that 
goes back to the idea that we talked about earlier, the idea 
that a living organism is a dynamo that produces excess ener-
gy gratuitously. 
And then the other part, that is theoretically incoherent, 
is that he wants to say that it is God, that it is the monotheist 
God, that it is one God who speaks, who is the source of 
demands on me in every face that looks at me. That concept 
reduces the singularity and the diversity of people, who face 






That dimension I did not like.  
Just to say it in a very general way, these two things I 
didn’t like. I didn’t like the constitutive phenomenology. Ac-
tually, this is the new thought I had a couple of weeks ago. It 
goes back to what I said of Merleau-Ponty a little bit and 
Whitehead. I mean, for constitutive phenomenology, and 
later for Derrida, the issue is that the world of my experience 
is in some way constituted by me. It’s me who outlines and 
circumscribes things into things, makes them into things and 
then gives them meaning. And of course for Derrida it goes 
through the grid of language. But to me, you know, I have 
this very simple-minded objection from evolutionary psy-
chology, that my experiences, my eyes are essentially similar 
to the eyes of other mammals. A cat or a fox sees the world 
as real things that exist in themselves, that are independent 
of them. That seems to me a very fundamental objection to 




JS: It seems that your conception of ethics is closely linked or 
even deeply intertwined with the realm of nature. In Danger-
ous Emotions you talk about human animals being in a fun-
damental relationship with living and non-living nature. You 
write about our affinity with animals, describing how move-
ments of our bodies, our emotions, pleasures, sexuality, and 
even virtues mimic theirs. Can you comment on your con-
ception of ethics? Which philosophers were sources of inspi-
ration for this conception? 
 
AL: I suppose I came from two directions. From Levinas 
starting with the idea that I see the needs and wants of 
someone who faces me and that puts an imperative on me 
and demand on me. And then I began to think—isn’t that 
also true, when I see other species, even plants, if I see a 





cherry tree that is broken by the wind, for example. I mean, I 
had this kind of simple statement, that I came upon a couple 
of years ago, that to see something is to see what it requires 
to exist. If I see a tree, I also see that it requires earth and 
sunlight. That’s true of anything. If I see an object of furni-
ture, I see that it requires a stable position in order to exist. 
We do see needs and wants directly. And then to see what it 
requires is to sense the kind of action that would supply this 
requirement. For example, if I see a deer, which has been 
caught in branches in the flooding river, I see that it needs to 
be freed from these branches or it will drown. And at the 
same time I see that I could do that. Or somebody could do 
that, if not me, maybe somebody else. I experience myself as 
different motor possibilities to rescue something or protect it, 
or restore, or repair it. That’s true just of our ordinary per-
ception. Just when we walk around, what we see are not just 
shapes and forms and colours. There are distinct and inde-
pendent beings, that we see what they require. And if we get 
active, we sense the sorts of actions that could supply their 
needs. So, I always started from thinking about Levinas’s 
idea that we see the other face as needy and putting demands 
on us and extending that across nature.  
Then, I guess, on the other side, I began thinking more 
and more about Kant and this idea of ethics being equated 
with conscious and rational actions. And once I began think-
ing this way, it seemed to me very clear that we don’t admire 
people who always act out of rationality. I think of some ex-
amples from literature, but I can take this example from div-
ing. You know, I went diving in the ocean a number of 
times. And when you dive, on the board there is a dive mas-
ter. And every dive master I ever went with, you know, you 
instinctually trusted. You saw that this is a man who is calm 
and collected. And if you are in trouble, he will save you. 
Maybe even at the risk of his own life. And then, you know, 






tainly, not a big contribution to the world, you know, people 
who are obese and lazy and egotistical and so on. And you 
see this strong young man would actually risk his life to save 
this person. And you can ask: Is it rational? I mean, whose 
life is worth more? But then you realise that the dive master 
doesn’t ask this question, “Is this person worth risking my life 
to save?” Because he acts instinctually. His bravery is some-
thing that we think is in his nature. This is a sort of thought 
we have. That some people are strong and brave and their 
acts are with clarity, they see what’s to be done at once. I 
mean, it is like the same person who sees somebody fallen 
into a river and instinctually jumps into frozen water to save 
that person.  
And then the other example I had is of some women who 
just simply seem to have a big heart. They’re just drawn to 
caring for children, and caring for animals. I think of some 
young farmer who I see at the pet store. She has, I don’t 
know, six or seven children, most of them are adopted. But at 
the same time, every time you see her at the store, you know, 
there are baby rabbits over here and the birds, and cats, and 
dogs. She just takes care of everything. She is a person who 
has a big heart. It’s like natural for her to take care of crea-
tures of all size. So, those are the sorts of people we admire 
and trust. If we have an orphan, we don’t want to give it to a 
woman who’s so rational and has to think out rationally the 
motivations for everything she does. We give to people 
whose goodness and caring nature is instinctual. There is a 
lot of that in Nietzsche—the idea that there are noble in-
stincts. And that people who are noble act by instinct. You 
know, these people are not very intelligent, they are not very 
calculating in that way. And as a result, sometimes they don’t 
survive so well, because they don’t calculate everything. They 
do generous and noble actions that may, you know, bring 
risks to themselves and loss to themselves, but this kind of 
noble generosity is instinctual and not calculating.  





JS: Is there a relation to animals here? 
 
AL: Almost every day I walk in the backyard and I see things 
that just blow my mind. You know, I live with a lot of birds. 
And you could see out in nature every day how these little 
birds attack cats and hawks and so on to save their nest. I 
mean, if you want to understand what is maternal instinct 
and mother love, you can see it in the very pure form in birds 
and other species. A lot of the virtues that we admire are vir-
tues that we share with other species. Like generosity and 




JS: Your books and essays often end with the themes of 
beauty, death, sacrifice, or the sacred. And such themes are 
articulated in close proximity to the realm of religion. It 
seems that via Bataille you link the realm of nature and besti-
ality with that of the sacred. Why do you think it is relevant 
to reflect on the realms of the sacred or the transcendent? 
Isn’t it because our ethical orientations and highest causes 
would be impossible to ground without such experiences and 
encounters? 
 
AL: Considering the last question, I can say that I have not 
gone in that direction. The thing that was for me so extraor-
dinary in Levinas is that there is an ethical experience. That 
direct perception of someone facing me is an experience of 
being obligated. So it is an immediate experience. Yeah, I 
was profoundly convinced of that.  
 
JS: And how do you distinguish it from just ordinary experi-
ences?  
 






it—I don’t remember where he wrote this, I think, I had 
some conversations with him—you walk by the street and 
somebody greets you and you already feel obliged to answer. 
It’s a demand. That’s very striking. And I think everybody 
feels that, I mean, it’s a direct experience, it’s not some, you 
know, hypothetical idea.  
Speaking about the influences on my understanding of 
the sacred, I think I was very influenced here by Bataille. I’ve 
got from him the idea that the sacred is not only the heaven-
ly, celestial, but is also in the realm of death and corruption, 
and blood, and sex, and so on. Bataille got it out of anthro-
pology, and that seems to me very true of real religions, reli-
gions that have existed in humanity. You know, when I 
spoke the other night about sacrilege. I feel that the word 
sacrilege can disappear from modern discourse, even from 
modern religious discourse, but I think that the sense of sac-
rilege is very strong, even in non-believers. To the idea that 
somebody would go in some sacred place and desecrate it, 
our first reaction is horror. I mean, to see what they did to 
the Egyptian pharaohs—to put them on display for tour-
ists—it’s just shocking. And you don’t have to believe in 
Egyptian religion to be shocked. We sense that there are 
things that are outside of the profane world, that are not just 
for use, and calculation and appropriation. And that there is 
a sort of sense of power in it. At that talk I emphasised this 
idea that death is power. There are corpses that are sacred in 
that way. There’s power there. There’s violence in a corpse. If 
we just take the word sacred in the etymological sense, “sa-
crum” in Latin is “separated.” It’s what is separated from the 
world of work and reason. I started to think in this way, in-
spired by Bataille, but then the more I thought of concrete 
cases, when I had reason to think about certain religious 
events and so on, it confirmed this thought.  
 
JS: But to you this experience does not work as a motivation 





for ethical actions? Or does it? 
 
AL: I think it does for a people who have a strong sense of 
the sacred. To some measure it would, but not in a kind of 
rationalistic way. You know, people say that we need religion 
as a kind of guarantee of the seriousness of ethical laws. That 
I don’t think is the case. That seems to me a kind of empty 
concept of religion. That God is a kind of super policeman. 
And it seems to me that most people don’t seriously believe 
that anyhow. I mean, the very fact that so many people who 
don’t believe and don’t have any religion, who are atheist, are 
often more irreproachably ethical and moral. We all know 
many such people. People are generous and truthful, and 
honest, and so on. And they have no idea that there is a po-




JS: I would like to put forward a question concerning your 
philosophy’s style or its form of expression. Your philosophi-
cal language is extremely figurative, personal, impressive, 
emotional, and even passionate. You do not avoid literari-
ness. 
 
AL: I guess I have two thoughts. First of all, I don’t like to 
think about how I write. Because, I think, I write naively. 
And, you know, if I have something that I want to com-
municate, sometimes I try it in one way, the other and then I 
find something that seems to work. But I don’t like to think 
about it. Because it seems to me that if one would think 
about it too much, one would make it into a kind of recipe. 
And that’s what I want to avoid.  
But on the other hand, I discovered this in teaching, in 
teaching like Heidegger. When I was trying to explain 






of the English language and English idiom, you know, I 
could actually say things that are clearer than Heidegger said. 
Can you grab this distinction between “existenzial” and “ex-
istenziell,” or even “ontic” and “ontological”? This is very bad 
terminology, because “ontological” should mean the logos, 
the discourse about the ontic. And that’s not what he means. 
He means the dimension of Being and not beings. He choo-
ses these technical words that often aren’t very good. Then I 
discovered that using English, for example, the translation 
they have of “Zuhandenheit” and “Vorhandenheit”—“read-
iness to hand” and “presence at hand.” That’s not English at 
all. It’s a verbal invention. It occurred to me one day—we 
have the ordinary English expression “within reach.” “Within 
reach” are the things that are available to the hand, and that’s 
the much better term for translation of “Zuhandenheit”. I 
began to think in that way, and I began to see that to really 
communicate clearly philosophical insights I want to use all 
the resources of language. And the real masters of language 
are literary writers. They are the ones who master the vo-
cabulary, and the grammar, and the rhetoric. I got further 
and further away from technical jargon. And then the other 
idea I have is very simple—I want to write well. I don’t see 
any virtue in writing bad English, confused, pompous, aca-
demic English. So these are very simple ideas. 
 
JS: When giving lectures you use music, photos, and other 
artistic elements, mixing them together into somewhat a uni-
fied performance. You read your texts rhythmically, and it 
sounds as if you narrate a poem. It seems that you try to cre-
ate an atmosphere of the ritual. Isn’t it?  
 
AL: Yeah, that too. I have a very simple idea—instead of a 
professor just standing behind the lectern and looking down 
and turning the pages, I play a little music, just a few minutes 
before and sometimes after. Because after the talk, usually 





you invite questions, but sometimes people need a few min-
utes to come up with a question. I would play a few minutes 
of music instead. It is things like that, very simple little ideas. 
So why not have photographs, images that would be helpful? 
You know, philosophers, of course, have always used images, 
sometimes as illustrations, but they don’t necessarily have to 
be direct illustration—sometimes an image just gives you a 
general sense of an atmosphere or a level, or dimension, or a 
mood. It doesn’t really have to be an illustration of some-
thing in your philosophical text. A few times I did a kind of 
complex performance bringing costume and make-up, and 
images, and music, and it was much more theatrical. But to 
me it is always hard to know how well they work, because I 
can’t see what the audience sees. I just thought that these 
things communicate more vividly, more forcefully, some-
times more clearly than just reading the text.  
 
JS: Is it based on your assumption that philosophy can’t be 
expressed fully within the realm of the concept alone? 
 
AL: In a certain way that’s true. And a kind of thought I had 
about it was this: A long time ago I had a colleague that I 
admired very much. He was very broadly read. He read eve-
rything. And he was not dogmatic, and he was open to 
things. And I was just a young guy at that time. And I was 
very devoted to Merleau-Ponty. And one day I thought he 
should read Merleau-Ponty. And I should give him the 
book. And then I began to think, if I gave him a book, he 
would read it, because he really read everything. But I 
thought that he didn’t have the kind of sensibility for it. And 
then you go to philosophy meetings, you see some people 
have a real Nietzschean sensibility. They perceive and feel, 
and discern things in a kind of Nietzschean way. And other 
people have a much more sort of logical and structured sensi-






are very devoted to Merleau-Ponty, or others to Heidegger, 
or others to Kant is not simply that they are convinced intel-
lectually by certain ideas. But also that a thinker thinks with 
his or her perceptions and sensibility too. I used to go to the-
se little meetings. There was a Husserl circle, and a Merleau-
Ponty circle. And really there were different kinds of people 
there. And there was a different mood, a different tone of 
voice—people spoke differently. So in Merleau-Ponty’s circle 
people had a kind of a soft voice, and subtlety. Whereas, in 
Husserl’s circle it was much more black and white. People 
were different.  
 
THE SENSE OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
JS: It seems that your philosophy is somehow deeply con-
nected with your practice of travelling. You travel to encoun-
ter uncultivated nature and often to non-Western regions, 
countries, places, communities, or persons. Am I right think-
ing that the aim of such travels, experiences, and encounters 
is to find an actual alternative to Western modernity, which 
was criticised by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others?  
 
AL: Again, my attitude is very simple. I always wanted to see 
the world. I’ve never got tired of it. It seems that most people 
get tired of the world after a while. They don’t want to go to 
Spain or Africa, just stay home. I never get tired of it. When 
I went to other places, I certainly was interested in the 
thought of these cultures as much as I could make contact 
with it. And I more and more respected the thought outside 
of this Western modern rationality.  
Somebody said yesterday that maybe philosophy will 
come to an end. For Heidegger philosophy is a Greek ration-
ality. He says philosophy is Greek and German. But maybe 
that will come to an end, at least in your lifetime. In this 
global world very soon, China will be the biggest economy 





and the dominant economy in the world. I wouldn’t be sur-
prised if this sort of characteristically Greek and German 
tradition of thinking comes to an end. Right now nothing is 
happening in philosophy anywhere: in Germany or France, 
or Scandinavia, or Japan, or in England—nowhere. But I 
don’t think we should see very much in that. Because it 
seems that in every realm of culture there aren’t great think-
ers in every generation. For a while it just looked like the 
West was imposing itself on everything. But now as the 
West is doing so badly economically, militarily, and so on, 
the other parts of the world are becoming much more affirm-
ative. It may well be that strands of thought that are leftover 
from the past—in Africa, in Asia, and so on—will become 
more important. There was a woman who was applying for 
the position in ethics at my university. And she pointed to 
the four most important ethical thinkers. I think they were 
British names. And she said they were all white males. She 
was suggesting that the ethics that we have is really con-
structed for white, male, middle-class academics. But for a 
long time what I always thought is that, if you read ethics 
books, it was so many of these examples that are so typically 
middle class, there are issues that come up only in this pros-
perous little bourgeois economy. And so it seemed to me that 
it was said that, if we talk about ethics, we shouldn’t talk 
about the situation of postcolonial Africa and Australian 
aboriginals, and Native Americans, and so on. So at least it 
seems to me that in the area of ethics we are beginning to get 
more diverse and global kinds of thinking. I imagine that in 
the future philosophy will be much more diverse. 
 
JS: Do you see something that is definitively worth saving in 
the Western tradition of philosophy, something that is 
uniquely from European sources? 
 
AL: Certainly. Absolutely. If we look at the bookshelf of the 
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main thinkers of philosophy from ancient Greece to today—
it’s an astonishing treasury of deep and enlightening thought. 
So many people outside philosophy feel that. I’m thinking of 
someone like Feyerabend who often read even ancient and 
medieval philosophers, because he found there such extraor-
dinary insights. As you know, Einstein was quite interested 
in Bergson—they had an exchange, and so on. It’s a marvel-
lous treasury of thought, this tradition of philosophy. And it 
seems to me that all of us who have some kind of conversa-
tion with people in another field (like in my university some-
times I am an outside reader for a dissertation in some other 
fields, in psychology, or history, or even in physics), you no-
tice that these people are always terribly interested in what 
philosophers have to say about it. Because they do find it very 
striking and often very helpful. It’s very precious not only for 
philosophers but for humanity. 
On Violence and Splendor 
by Graham Harman 
Fans of Alphonso Lingis have cause for delight in the recent 
appearance of his new book Violence and Splendor.1 Lingis is 
of Lithuanian ancestry but native to the rural region near 
Chicago, and has been well known since the 1960s in several 
capacities. In his early career he was known primarily as an 
encyclopedic authority on French phenomenology, in partic-
ular as the key English translator of the philosophers Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty. As a professor at Penn State he was a 
popular and magnetic character, earning the allegiance of 
generations of students due to an informal personality and a 
startling mid-block household filled with live tropical birds, 
sharks, octopi, and electric eels, life-sized wooden Buddhas, 
flourishing colonies of bees, specimens of colorful moths and 
beetles, and a bathroom mirrored on all horizontal and verti-
cal surfaces. As an author of books he emerged relatively late, 
in 1983, with his debut Excesses: Eros and Culture.2 This work 
set the pattern for his future writings, mixing philosophical 
erudition with travel narratives from the most exotic loca-
tions. Along the way he established a reputation with many 
readers (including me) as one of the greatest living masters of 
English prose. Lingis has been retired from Penn State for 
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nearly a decade and now lives near Baltimore, where he con-
tinues to write in the same spirit found in his earlier books. 
Aside from his running commentary in a recent book of 
photographs by Mark Cohen,3 Violence and Splendor is the 
first new book by Lingis to appear since The First Person Sin-
gular in 2007.4 Lingis’s favored genre is the short or medium-
sized chapter. Aside from his 1998 classic The Imperative, we 
rarely find Lingis attempting to systematize the content of 
his books. Perhaps in keeping with Nietzsche’s maxim that 
“the will to system is a will to falsity,” he prefers to maintain 
the integrity of his individual chapter themes, not yoking 
them together with any sort of rigid framework. In one re-
spect Violence and Splendor takes this preference to a new ex-
treme, offering twenty-five short pieces clustered together in 
five parts of varying length. Those parts are entitled as fol-
lows: Spaces Within Spaces, Snares for the Eye, The Sacred, 
Violence, Splendor. But in another respect, the new book 
links its sections loosely through recurring references and 
proper names, like Wagnerian leitmotifs announcing the oc-
casional reappearance of sword, giant, and Tarnhelm. Not 
surprisingly, the book is a pleasure to read; it is even a pleas-
ure to gaze upon and leaf through, due to the author’s typi-
cally enchanting photography. In what follows I will offer 
samplings from the book by briefly considering one chapter 
from each of its five sections. 
The opening chapter of the book is entitled “Extremes,” 
and is noteworthy for its style no less than its content. Like 
many high artists, Lingis often reacts with boredom or dis-
may to technical speculations on the workings of his style. 
Yet I am obliged to risk his annoyance here by noting his 
powerful use of second-person narrative, one of the staples of 
his books. On the very first page of Violence and Splendor, we 
read as follows: “Forty years ago you crossed the Atlantic by 
ship . . .”; “In Bali you got very sick . . .”; “From Tierra del 
Fuego you took a ship to Antarctica . . .”.5 No, I did not. But 





in the hands of Lingis the technique is powerful, forcing the 
reader into an illusion of direct experience. Of course, this 
apparently direct experience is mediated through the sugges-
tions and recollections of Lingis himself, who resembles a 
hypnotist or a Gandalf telling us our fate in reverse. The 
opening chapter of the book has no “plot” and reaches no 
conclusion. Instead, it simply draws us from our normal 
space of daily life and thrusts us into a new geography. While 
ill with hepatitis in Bali, we have nothing to do but kill sev-
eral weeks on the seashore, not far from the shark-patrolled 
Wallace Trench, seven kilometers deep. The Balinese “are 
not seagoing people,”6 Lingis says, reminding us of Gibbon’s 
remarks on the terror of the great ocean as felt by the Ro-
mans, bound as they were to their little Mediterranean.7 The 
Balinese irrigate their crops from the crater lakes of volca-
noes, “but at the end of the day” these Balinese “descend to 
the ocean shore, hundreds of them, and seat themselves on 
the dunes where they wait, silenced by the descending sun.”8 
Your hepatitis is no longer a miserable tourist’s setback, but 
an opportunity to rest side by side on the Balinese seashore 
with the silent natives descended each evening from their 
volcanic highland lakes. In the next paragraph you are on a 
ship to Antarctica. You are not initially in romantic authorial 
isolation far at sea. Instead, you are surrounded by numerous 
other tourists, though you soon sequester yourself in your 
room and gain a reputation as an anti-social. Left alone, “you 
gaze in silence at the glaciers imperceptibly flowing into the 
ocean, ice millions of years old, compacted under enormous 
weight so that the crystalline structure of the ice is 
changed . . . .”9 In one sense, nothing at all has happened in 
this page-and-a-half of an opening chapter. But in another, 
you may as well have traveled to another planet with these 
brief introductory words. You have entered the world of Al-
phonso Lingis, in which the reader shares the most astound-
ing travel experiences with the author, who successfully cre-
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ates the illusion that no author is present and that everything 
is unfolding in the reader’s own life. There is incredible soli-
tude in this literary world, despite the generosity of the au-
thor’s descriptions, and despite the lack of elitism in the 
friendships he has us strike up along the way with slum-
dwellers, academics, artists, dentists, and young children. 
The title of Chapter 9, “The Fallen Giant,” is a phrase 
normally used metaphorically to describe prominent humans 
who have undergone an abrupt diminution in social status. 
But here it is meant literally, and refers to an actually fallen 
actual giant from the world of plants. As Lingis begins: “The 
sign does not say when the sequoia fell. Or why. Perhaps it 
died of old age.”10 We are immediately informed that sequoi-
as have been known to live up to 3,267 years. Counting 
backwards, this places us in 1256 B.C. as the possible 
birthdate of a sequoia dying of old age today—born five years 
prior to Hercules, and dead under Obama, Cameron, and 
Sarkozy. A flood of numbers quickly follows. The dead se-
quoia was 220 feet high and 72.6 feet in circumference. Like 
all numbers, these give us little guidance except by way of 
comparison, and this is just what Lingis gives us: a blue 
whale can be up to 110 feet long, and the figure rises to 130 
feet for the dinosaur known as Argentinosaurus huinculensis. 
Both of these colossal sentient creatures are eclipsed by the 
fallen sequoia now lying before us. The author invites us fur-
ther to imagine the ascent of the tree, its life fully invested in 
upward ascent, given that many of its branches die along the 
way. In the manner of Leibniz, Lingis observes that this tree 
is not a mere aggregate of parts: “the life attached to the 
enormous inner space of the sequoias, to these hundreds of 
tons of matter, is somehow one. One life governs the system 
you see in the branches . . .”11 Nonetheless, “each branch has 
to adjust to local conditions and events,” and “the mighty 
trunk itself . . . [also] has had to adjust to the impact and 
pressures of events. Swerves of bark mark these adjust-





ments.”12 But despite these local variations and events, Lingis 
remains true to the guiding insight of phenomenology con-
cerning the unity of sensuous objects beneath their sparkling 
contours. For “when this tree died, it died everywhere,”13 and 
“the sense of life attached to the enormous inner space of a 
sequoia, or to that of a beached blue whale, dominates our 
perception of their surface colors and forms.”14 Elsewhere, 
our sense of the unified life of “guppies or sand-
flies . . . overwhelms our fascination with their external de-
signs and colors.”15 The potency of this life is often stagger-
ing. Tiny plants of 0.6 millimeters in size, Lingis reports, are 
able “to produce 1 nonillion (1 with thirty zeroes) new plants 
in four months, a volume of flowering plants equal to the size 
of the Earth.”16 These reflections on the inner life of things 
turn Lingis explicitly to a meditation on the philosophical 
concept of substance, which he has elsewhere tried to revive in 
a stirring and under-read article on Levinas, printed in an 
obscure periodical. 17  Modern philosophy “pronounced us 
incapable of knowing the substance, the nature, or the es-
sence of things.”18 Empiricist philosophy turns appearances 
into discrete sense data, phenomenology converts them into 
shifting profiles, and Heidegger into an instrumental layout 
of practical purposes. But Lingis (with a passing nod to Oli-
ver Sacks) makes the intriguing claim that “the distinction 
between appearances and things that appear is peculiar to 
vision and does not really have analogues in the realm of 
sound, taste, odor, and the tangible.”19 Summarizing Heide-
gger’s distinction between the zuhanden and the vorhanden, 
in which entities become visible primarily through malfunc-
tion, Lingis asks: “is not this a strangely narrow picture of 
our experience?”20 Far from agreeing that substances are inac-
cessible to human knowledge, Lingis favors a form of what 
analytic philosophers call “direct realism,” in which human 
insight makes direct contact with the things rather than with 
mere representations of them: “When we look at the butter-
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flies, trees, and mountains in their independence of and in-
difference to us, we see them as they are.”21 
Chapter 9, “Sacrilege,” begins with a sinister photograph 
of knives, followed shortly thereafter by sinister words: “In a 
sacrifice something supremely precious—our finest harvest 
and livestock, our firstborn son—is set aside from all use, 
separated from the profane sphere. What is set apart from all 
profane use is separated absolutely, definitively, in being de-
stroyed.”22 It is in this spirit that we must interpret the two 
most troubling stories in the book, both of them found in the 
present chapter. In the first story, the author visits a photog-
raphy show and passes behind the photos to find a disturbing 
installation: “a man, powerfully muscled and virile, naked, 
hanging upside down, his feet bound by a rope looped over a 
hook in the ceiling.”23 This is a real man, no mannequin. 
Along the walls are “piles of knives . . . butcher knives, ser-
rated knives, hunting knives,”24 as if placed there deliberately 
to incite cruelty against the naked human suspended from 
the ceiling. Although Lingis remains passive, his companions 
do not: “Finally one of us took a knife and cut the rope; the 
man fell to the floor.” A student named Andy mutters alarm-
ingly: “The show is not over like that.” Andy grabs a knife, 
stabs at the naked man with full force, but barely succeeds in 
grazing his body. Instead, the sacrificial animal turns out to 
be Andy himself, for “he had thrust so violently that, without 
realizing it or feeling it, his hand had slipped off the handle 
and down the blade, which cut deeply into the palm of his 
hand and his fingers.”25 Blood splatters everywhere, as with 
any sacrifice by knife. Later, surgeons are unable to fully re-
pair the damaged hand, and Andy’s career as a musician 
(“something supremely precious”) is ended. Nonetheless, he 
emerges from this saga “more energized and ebullient than 
before.”26 Lingis adopts a less passive role in the second story, 
giving us instead a confession worthy of Augustine or Rous-
seau. Lingis meets a young boy in Istanbul named Omar, 





who takes him to the cathedral of Saint George; as a Mus-
lim, the boy prefers to wait outside. Amidst the candles and 
incense of the empty cathedral, he finds the tombs of the 
Patriarchs of Orthodox Christendom. Checking carefully to 
make sure no one is in the cathedral, he opens the heavy lid 
of one of them; blood rushing to his face, he finds only a 
bronze coffin. Thwarted by this unexpected obstacle, his 
temptation to sacrilege might seem to have passed. But much 
like the Franks cutting down the sacred trees of the Goths,27 
his urge to violate the sacred remains unquenched: “I moved 
back to the catafalque, lifted the lid again, set it back and 
lifted the lid of the bronze coffin.” The final obstruction to 
sacrilege now removed, the author witnesses “a dark brown 
skull showing under what looked like shreds of dried beef, 
scabs in the eye sockets, and patches of skin shriveled from 
the crooked rows of the teeth.”28 Leaving the cathedral, he 
goes off for tea with an unsuspecting young Omar, though 
“the enormity of what I had done tormented me for days, for 
weeks.”29 Perhaps what makes the tale so disturbing is that it 
lacks any of the usual motives to crime (and if discovered in 
the act, it is as a criminal that he would have been treated). 
We imagine most crime as motivated by the pursuit of 
wealth, of sexual violation, or perhaps of revenge. The coffins 
of Saint George were left relatively unsecured for the simple 
reason that, unlike gold, no one really aspires to direct com-
merce with the decayed head of an Orthodox Patriarch. 
While the author expands his geography beyond the United 
States to include such regions as Balinese fields beneath vol-
canic craters, the glaciers of the Antarctic, and the inner lives 
of sequoias and microbes, he also finds himself tempted to 
cross the sacred boundary separating us from the sealed-off 
remains of the dead. But the teahouses of Istanbul do not 
assuage his conscience, as for once he discovers a space in the 
world that he wishes he had never entered. 
The theme of corpses returns in Chapter 21, “The Art of 
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War.” War has been glorified in the arts from ancient times 
until relatively recently. “This art depicted the ruler as sub-
lime in himself, absorbing into his destiny the lives of name-
less multitudes. It depicted the blood of defeated armies and 
massacred populations turning into golden radiance about 
the victorious warlord.”30 Above these corpses stand God or 
the nation, apportioning mass death by a supreme and glori-
ous decree. The situation changes with Francisco de Goya’s 
series of etchings, Disasters of War, first published in 1863, 
more than half a century after their completion. Goya had 
experienced the Napoleonic rampage through Spain, and 
though he was accused of French sympathies himself, that 
sympathy is not evident in his etchings. “They depict close-
up men cornered and disarmed and then castrated and dis-
membered, the infirm and aged unable to fight or flee [are] 
butchered, children mutilated and slaughtered.”31 The heroic 
narratives of war are replaced by an art in which “soldiers, 
peasants, women and children tear at one another like so 
many rabid dogs. Goya depicts mutilated corpses covered 
with flies and picked at by vultures under dark skies, where 
there is no god above to witness, pity, and redeem so much 
agony, so many deaths.”32 These depictions of massacre later 
become an object of massacre themselves, at the hands of the 
“shock jock” British artists Jake and Dinos Chapman, who 
serve as recurring characters throughout Lingis’s book. “In 
the year 2000 they purchased for £50,000 a set of Goya’s 
etchings, and painted grinning clown and puppy-dog faces 
over the faces Goya had depicted stricken with heart-
wrenching pathos.”33 
And here we encounter one of the central tensions of Vio-
lence and Splendor. On the one hand we still find the Lingis 
of The Imperative, for whom it is ethically binding to stamp 
out a burning cigarette in a forest, and even binding not to 
abuse the preciousness of such items as rare bottles of wine 
by consuming them carelessly or under inappropriate circum-





stances. In the chapter on the sequoia described earlier, when 
Lingis muses that “perhaps it died of old age,” we sense his 
genuine concern that it might have been knocked down 
through the perversity of vandals or a lumber company. Eve-
rywhere in his writings, Lingis seems concerned that the in-
trinsic powers of the things themselves should be allowed to 
shine forth in all their splendor. But The Imperative is not 
really a “normative” book, since there Lingis also admits that 
there is an indeterminacy related to the existence of an im-
perative in things. As he wrote in that work, with a gripping 
cruelty: “We do have the power to crush the penguin chick 
and knock over the sunflower with a blow, as we may block 
and muddy the river, but our cruelty and our disdain feel the 
panic of the chick and the vertical aspiration of the sunflow-
er.”34 In this sense The Imperative is more a work of ontology, 
and counts as a book of ethics only insofar as our ethical sub-
tlety is ripened by the notion of a command emanating from 
the inner life of things. For the existence of an imperative can 
also serve to provoke aggression and violation, as in the cases 
of the naked man hanging from the ceiling of an art gallery, 
the coffin of an Orthodox Patriarch, humans reduced to mu-
tilated corpses by Napoleonic armies, or the art treasures of 
Goya defenseless against vandalism by the Chapman Broth-
ers—who would perhaps be interested in crushing the pen-
guin chick, knocking over the sunflower with a blow, and 
blocking and muddying the river, presumably uttering swear 
words while doing so. Not only is this ambiguity never re-
solved by Lingis—it is even the central theme of his book, as 
seen from the two main words in the title Violence and Splen-
dor. But the author limits himself to describing this reversi-
bility rather than attempting to resolve it. 
The book ends with Chapter 25, “War and Splendor.” 
This chapter ends the book on a warm note of optimism, 
with splendor prevailing over violence. It begins with the Rio 






years to purchase costumes for an escola de samba (samba 
club). In Carnaval, “everything—plants, insects, birds, beasts, 
heroes, knaves—becomes beauty, samba, and alegria.”35 The 
contrast between Lingis’s first visit to Carnaval and contem-
porary world events is explicitly marked: “I arrived the week 
of the outbreak of the First Gulf War, in which thirty-four 
advanced countries united in no higher cause than to secure 
for themselves the sources of cheap petroleum. At the Rio 
Carnaval, I thought this is the most important event on the 
planet.”36 The collected writings of Lingis might easily be 
viewed as a multi-volume account of a global Rio Carnaval, 
with “the Rio Amazonas and Rio Tocantins, the spectacled 
bears, the golden lion tamarins, and the toucans, the Indians 
of the Amazon and the outposts of the Inca, the queens of 
Africa, the bandeirantes (slave hunters and prospectors), the 
quilombolas (escaped slaves), the travelers of outer space.”37 
The chapter shifts quickly from the Rio Carnaval to a similar 
outburst of alegria in Papua New Guinea, at the so-called 
Mount Hagen show (the gorgeous photograph on the book’s 
cover depicts a Mount Hagen celebrant). Although the Pa-
puans were dismissed by Australians as “Stone Age people 
and savages,”38 Lingis reports that their wars were primarily 
theatrical: “When battles did break out, they were so con-
strained by rules and fought with weapons so ineffective—
the arrows without fletching are really inaccurate—that it 
would be rare that anyone was actually killed.”39 While the 
First Gulf War prepares industrial mechanisms for slaughter 
in the name of cheap oil, Lingis finds that war in Papua is 
splendor: “battles were fought without leaders or strategies, 
each warrior darting and shooting his arrows where he could, 
exposed to volleys of arrows and spears, exposed not only to 
cunning and hostile humans but also to supernatural powers 
and the weapons of sorcery. Battles where no territory was 
taken, nor women captured or wealth plundered.”40 We are 
no longer in the world of Goya, and also not in the world of 





Jake and Dinos Chapman, despite the author’s trace of ap-
parent sympathy for their frank violations of normal limits of 
artistic behavior. Ultimately, Lingis’s real preference is not 
for crushing the penguin chick, but for splendor in all its his-
torical and animal forms: 
 
We shall not define with one concept the splendor 
that glitters and resounds under Mount Hagen, in the 
liturgical processions in Byzantium and the high mass 
of Medieval cathedrals, in the Negara, the theater-
state of old Bali, in Carnival in Rio de Janeiro—in the 
plumage and dance of the Great Argus pheasant, in 
the sun’s gold spread over the blue oceans, in the fish-
erman rowing with golden oars . . .  We are mesmer-
ized by beauty as birds-of-paradise are mesmerized by 
their glittering plumes in their courtship dances; we 
create beauty as in the primordial ocean mollusks cre-
ate the iridescent colors and intricate designs of their 
shells.41 
 
In recent philosophy we find no other prose stylist capable of 
such extended literary brilliance—not even in France, where 
Merleau-Ponty’s finest gemstones tend to be wrapped and 
muffled in the surrounding cotton of technical argument. 
For this reason, it seems appropriate to end this review of 
Lingis’s latest book with the closing half-sentence of the 
book itself. When observing the festival at Mount Hagen, 
the second highest volcano in Papua New Guinea: “you feel 
your blood hot and surging with the exultation of two thou-
sand men and women, of 125 tribes, zigzagging back and 
forth like slow-motion bolts of lightning across the crowded 
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